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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Middle East is immersed in its worst crisis in years 
following the capture of three Israeli soldiers by the 
Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and 
Lebanese Party of God (Hizbollah) in late June 2006 and 
early July, Israel’s comprehensive offensive throughout 
the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, and the daily firing of 
rockets deep into Israel. And horrific as it is, the current 
toll of death and destruction could reach entirely different 
proportions should a new threshold be crossed – a 
Hizbollah rocket that strikes a chemical plant or a heavily 
populated area in Tel Aviv or Haifa, an Israeli bombing 
raid resulting in massive casualties, a major ground 
offensive, or the expansion of the war to Syria or Iran. A 
political solution to the twin crises of Lebanon and 
Palestine must be the international community’s urgent 
priority. Waiting and hoping for military action to achieve 
its purported goals will have not only devastating 
humanitarian consequences: it will make it much harder 
to pick up the political pieces when the guns fall silent. 
This report pieces together the strands of this multi-
headed crisis in Israel, the occupied Palestinian territories, 
Lebanon and elsewhere, based on talks with officials and 
others, including Hamas and Hizbollah representatives. 
There are many dimensions to the explanation of why the 
capture of three soldiers has, so suddenly and so 
intensely, escalated at an extraordinary pace into a deep 
and widespread conflict: local ones like Hamas’s struggle 
to govern and Hizbollah’s desire to maintain its special 
status in Lebanon; regional ones, notably the ongoing 
Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria’s interests in Lebanon, and the 
growing Sunni-Shiite divide; and wider international 
ones, especially the confrontation between Washington 
and Tehran. 
As the international community wrestles with this crisis, 
analysis from the ground suggests several key principles 
that ought to be followed. 
First, the Gaza and Lebanon crises need to be dealt 
with separately. Though related both chronologically 
and in terms of the sparks that triggered them, the 
reasons behind Hamas’s action have little to do with 
those motivating Hizbollah’s. Bundling them together 
only complicates efforts at resolution.  
Secondly, resolution of the Palestinian crisis should 
rest on a simple equation: governance in exchange 
for a cessation of hostilities. Of the two crises, the 
Palestinian one is relatively simpler to address: its origins 
are bilateral in nature (Hamas versus Israel), and so too 
can be its resolution. Hamas’s message is straightforward: 
let us govern, or watch us fight. Governing, as Crisis 
Group recently reported, is what the Islamists have not 
been permitted to do. The strategy of Fatah, the wider 
Arab world, Israel and the West alike since the 25 
January parliamentary elections has been to isolate and 
squeeze the Palestinian government in order to precipitate 
its collapse. The approach was always short-sighted and 
dangerous and it urgently needs to be revised. A deal 
appears attainable and should be pursued. It involves a 
prisoner exchange; a restored truce and – if any resulting 
tranquillity is not to be fleeting – an end to the international 
boycott of the Palestinian Authority (PA) government. 
That boycott never made much sense in terms of 
Europe’s and America’s stated objective of inducing 
change in Hamas’s positions and policies. It makes 
even less sense now if the goal is to prevent all-out 
deterioration. The 25 June 2006 signing of a National 
Conciliation Document by Fatah, Hamas and other 
Palestinian organisations on the basis of the Prisoners’ 
Initiative, the decision to form a national unity government 
and the designation of President Abbas as the person 
in charge of negotiations with Israel do not quite add 
up to the conditions put forward by the Quartet for 
normalising its relations with the PA government. But 
incomplete as they may be, they should be enough – 
together with a reciprocal and monitored ceasefire – 
to trigger a different approach by the international 
community or, if the U.S. is not yet prepared to go 
along, at least by the EU and other Quartet members. 
Thirdly, an immediate Israeli-Lebanese ceasefire 
is necessary: pursuing a military knockout is 
unrealistic and counterproductive. The Lebanese case 
is far more complex. What potentially might have been 
yet another chapter in the ongoing tit-for-tat between 
Israel and Hizbollah has become something very 
different. The brazen nature of the initial Hizbollah 
operation, coupled with the fact that it closely followed 
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Hamas’s capture of one of its soldiers, lent it, in Israeli 
eyes, an entirely new meaning. Fearing a dangerous 
erosion of its military deterrence on two fronts 
simultaneously, the new government quickly escalated 
in an effort to achieve decisive outcomes against its 
adversaries. Hizbollah followed suit, for the first time 
launching rockets deep into Israel. Step by rapid step, 
the stakes and nature of the conflict have shifted: Israel 
increasingly sees it as a battle for its and the region’s 
future; Hizbollah – torn between its identity as a 
Lebanese/Shiite movement and a messianic Arab-
Islamist one – has increasingly slipped into the latter. On 
both sides, a tactical fight is metamorphosing into an 
existential war. 
The key to managing this conflict, therefore, is to 
ensure it reverts to more manageable size by producing a 
ceasefire that puts an immediate, reciprocal end to 
attacks. To achieve that goal will require agreement on 
two steps that would rapidly follow: a prisoner swap 
and an understanding between all parties (Hizbollah 
included) that the current UN presence in South 
Lebanon will be strengthened with a multinational 
force. Injection of such a force carries considerable 
risk, as Lebanon’s history suggests: given the depth of 
confessional divisions in Lebanon, it could trigger a 
deadly civil conflict. But in the absence of a strong 
Lebanese army, and given legitimate Israeli concerns, 
it has become a regrettable necessity. Bearing all this 
in mind, and mindful too of sobering lessons from 
Iraq, any such force should have a limited mandate 
(principally verifying adherence to the ceasefire), be 
authorised by the UN Security Council, work closely 
with the Lebanese army, and ensure it does not become 
an unwitting party to Lebanon’s sectarian battles. 
Anything more ambitious at this time – including Israel’s 
desire to prolong military efforts until Hizbollah is 
crippled, and dispatch of a force charged with disarming 
the movement or full implementation of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1559 – could bring Lebanon to 
breaking point, risking more loss of life and serious 
escalation. Israeli and U.S. hopes that Hizbollah can 
rapidly be cut down to size, that the Lebanese 
government will confront it and its civilians rise 
against it, fly in the face of history. Hizbollah has not 
been significantly weakened nor, despite broad anger 
at its action, has its position on the Lebanese scene 
markedly eroded. In the past, Israeli military operations 
have only bolstered militant elements and, over time, 
rallied domestic opinion around them. The central 
government is not now, nor will it be soon, in a 
position to act against a movement that represents a 
critical domestic constituency and is present at all national 
levels – the government included. Should Hizbollah 
and its allies be pushed in a corner, they are liable to 
react, even at the cost of destabilising the country as a 
whole, disrupting its precarious inter-confessional balance 
and plunging it into a new round of sectarian strife. 
Achieving the desired outcome while minimising risks to 
Lebanon’s stability will require the EU and UN to 
continue talking to Hizbollah despite pressures to cease. It 
also will require engagement with Syria, preferably by the 
U.S. Damascus repeatedly has demonstrated its nuisance 
capacity in Lebanon; it needs to be given incentives to 
cooperate, along with clear warnings if it does not. 
Fourthly, to be sustainable, the ceasefire needs to be 
urgently followed by intensive diplomatic efforts to 
tackle root causes – all of them. A ceasefire by definition 
will be fragile and at best temporary, for it does not meet 
core concerns. Israel would be left with a hostile, armed 
force to its north; Lebanon with the reality of an 
autonomous militia and a southern neighbour eager to 
eradicate Hizbollah; and both the latter and its Syrian 
ally with unaddressed political issues. The U.S. is 
correct in asserting that “root causes” need to be 
addressed, but this cannot be done selectively nor should 
the international community stop half-way by focusing 
exclusively on Hizbollah’s status. 
Recent history should serve as a guide. The international 
community has identified important goals but gone 
about achieving them in all the wrong ways: UN 
Security Council Resolution 1559’s fundamental flaw 
was that it aimed at internationalising the Hizbollah 
question without regionalising the quest for a solution. It 
is not possible to remove Hizbollah’s arms without 
dealing with the justifications it invokes for maintaining 
them; to remake Lebanon by focusing on Hizbollah at 
the expense of broader questions related to the confessional 
distribution of power; and to do all this by isolating 
and targeting Syria, not involving it. Instead, continuous, 
robust and comprehensive diplomatic effort is required on 
several levels simultaneously: 
 resumption of an urgent internal Lebanese dialogue 
on full implementation of the 1989 Taif Accords 
and Resolution 1559 items; 
 swift return of displaced persons to the South as 
prolongation of the current untenable situation risks 
producing an internal explosion; 
 urgent donor and especially Arab commitments 
to help with Lebanon’s reconstruction; 
 resolution of pending Israeli-Lebanese issues so 
as to dry up the complaints that feed Hizbollah’s 
militancy;  
 engaging Syria and Iran as a means of inducing 
Hizbollah cooperation; and  
 reinvigorating the whole Israeli-Arab peace process. 
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This last point is key. The accelerated plunge into the 
abyss is the price paid for six years of diplomatic neglect; 
without a negotiating process, regional actors have been 
left without rules of the game, reference points or arbiters. 
In this respect, although their dynamics are different and 
they need separate solutions, the Palestinian and Lebanese 
crises clearly intersect. Only through a serious and 
credible rekindling of the long dormant peace process can 
there be any hope whatsoever of addressing, and 
eliminating, root causes. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
To the Quartet (U.S., EU, Russia, UN), the 
Governments of Lebanon and Israel, the 
Palestinian Authority, Hizbollah and All Other 
Relevant Parties: 
1. Deal with the Gaza and Lebanon crises separately.  
2. Address the Palestinian crisis by pursuing a deal 
including the following elements:  
(a) Hamas must release the Israeli soldier it 
holds and reinstate the truce while the 
Palestinian Authority must seek to stop all 
militias from firing rockets;  
(b) simultaneously, Israel must end its Gaza 
incursion, cease offensive military operations 
in the occupied territories and release 
recently jailed cabinet members and 
parliamentarians as well as other Palestinian 
prisoners (such as those who have not been 
charged with an offence, have been 
convicted on minor charges or are 
seriously ill or underage); and 
(c) the international boycott of the Palestinian 
Authority government should end.  
3. Seek an immediate Israeli-Lebanese ceasefire 
with clear understandings that it will include the 
following elements: 
(a) an immediate, reciprocal cessation of attacks; 
(b) an early prisoner swap; and 
(c) agreement by all parties on strengthening 
the current UN presence in South Lebanon 
with a UN-mandated multinational force 
charged with verifying adherence to the 
ceasefire and working closely with the 
Lebanese army. 
4. Follow the ceasefire with urgent and intensive 
diplomatic efforts to tackle all relevant root 
causes, with efforts focused simultaneously on: 
(a) an internal Lebanese dialogue on full 
implementation of the Taif Accords and 
Resolution 1559 items, including: 
i. eventual disarmament or integration 
into the army of Hizbollah; 
ii. reforming the political system; and 
iii. establishing a more credible, national 
army and security doctrine that can 
ensure the country’s defence; 
(b) prompt return of displaced persons to the 
South; 
(c) donor and especially Arab commitments 
to provide significant and urgent financial 
assistance to help rebuild Lebanon and 
alleviate its public debt; 
(d) resolution of pending Israeli-Lebanese 
issues, including: 
i. the fate of the contested Shebaa 
farms, with formal agreement by 
Syria that Shebaa is Lebanese and by 
Israel that it will withdraw; 
ii. Israeli incursions into Lebanese water 
and airspace; and 
iii. cooperation on demining efforts;  
(e) engaging Syria, reintegrating it into the 
regional equation and discarding any agenda 
of externally-imposed regime change in 
exchange for its commitment to halt 
destabilisation efforts in Lebanon and for 
support on Hizbollah’s gradual disarmament 
or integration into the Lebanese army; 
(f) engaging Iran by addressing a broad array 
of issues, including the nuclear question, 
Iraq, and the region as a whole; and  
(g) reinvigorating the Arab-Israeli peace process 
in both its Palestinian and Syrian tracks. 
Amman/Beirut/Jerusalem/Brussels, 25 July 2006 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a one-two punch that may not have been coordinated 
but nonetheless had a multiplier effect, Palestinian and 
Lebanese militants conducted bold military operations, 
each from territory Israel previously had evacuated, both 
resulting in the capture of Israeli soldiers and triggering 
disproportionate responses. On 25 June 2006, three 
militant Palestinian organisations, including Hamas, 
attacked a military base, killing two soldiers and seizing a 
third. On 12 July, Hizbollah militants entered Israel and 
captured two soldiers while killing three others; when 
Israeli troops pursued them into Lebanese territory, they 
hit again, killing five more.  
At its core, Israel’s basic reaction to the two events 
essentially has been the same: categorical rejection of any 
negotiation or prisoner swap – which Hamas and Hizbollah 
each put forward as their core demand – and military 
responses designed to neutralise the militant organisations 
and erode their missile launching capabilities, and, by 
aiming at far broader targets, to generate pressure on them 
to release the captives. Israeli troops re-entered the Gaza 
Strip, in the process killing scores of Palestinians, 
destroying vital infrastructure and effectively isolating the 
territory from the outside world, risking a humanitarian 
catastrophe. At the same time, Israel seized and jailed 
Hamas ministers and parliamentarians from the West 
Bank. If the ostensible goal was to achieve the soldiers’ 
release, other motives appeared at play: to weaken Hamas 
and, perhaps, accelerate its government’s collapse.  
This logic was more openly on display in the Lebanese 
arena. Circumstances there were different and, from 
Israel’s perspective, far graver. Unlike Hamas, Hizbollah 
possesses a redoubtable military arsenal that can 
threaten cities deep inside the country. For years, Israeli 
leaders had warily watched this situation, sensing a 
confrontation was inevitable. The Islamists’ operation 
was the tipping point; with that, all bets were off. 
Unleashing a fierce response, Israel imposed a blockade, 
targeted Beirut’s airport, Lebanese harbours and key 
roads, hit the country’s infrastructure, pounded Hizbollah’s 
strongholds in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley and 
south Beirut, killing approximately 400 civilians and 
forcing the displacement of more than half a million. 
Here too objectives reached across several levels: the 
release of the two soldiers, the demolition of Hizbollah’s 
destructive capacity; instigation of domestic anger at 
Hizbollah; and international involvement to ensure it no 
longer could replenish its arms or again establish itself 
within proximity of Israel’s northern border.  
Hizbollah has replied with its own escalation. Crude 
rockets, launched indiscriminately, have for the first 
time hit civilian population centres in cities such as 
Haifa, Tiberias, Afula and Nazareth. As of 24 July, 41 
Israelis have died, 17 of them civilians killed by the 
rockets in the north; many live in constant fear of the 
next attack and have been forced to flee their homes 
or find shelter. Israeli intelligence fears other weapons 
may be in Hizbollah’s hands: longer-range ballistic 
missiles that might be capable of reaching Tel Aviv 
and prove more devastating still.  
Escalation is in the very nature of this type of conflict. 
Israel perceives it in existential terms, as a choice 
between allowing armed organisations dedicated to its 
destruction to operate with impunity or tackling them 
forcefully. Hizbollah also believes its role and existence 
are at stake; it cannot back down without risking 
irrevocable defeat. If Hamas feels itself unable to 
govern, it would rather go down fighting than failing. 
Only smart, calibrated and urgent international intervention 
can stop the slide further into the abyss. 
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II. THE VIEW FROM PALESTINE  
In its latest report on the Palestinian situation,1 Crisis 
Group noted that resolving the ongoing crisis required 
three accommodations: an internal, Palestinian one over 
distribution of power and responsibilities; an Israeli one 
with Hamas and the PA over a mutual ceasefire and 
recognition of the Hamas government’s right to govern; 
and one between the Palestinian government and the 
international community over the disbursement of vital 
donor aid. In the few weeks that have elapsed, the intra-
Palestinian dialogue has made noteworthy albeit still 
tentative strides, with the achievement of the National 
Conciliation Document between Hamas, Fatah and other 
political organisations on 25 June (see box below). The 
relationship with Israel dramatically deteriorated, however, 
in the aftermath of Operation Dispelled Illusion, a 
Palestinian operation conducted earlier that same day, 
which resulted in the capture of an Israeli soldier. 
Throughout, the international community has remained 
remarkably passive, doing far too little either to consolidate 
the emerging Palestinian consensus or to avert continued 
Israeli-Palestinian escalation. 
The three dimensions are closely intertwined. The current 
confrontation is only partly an Israeli-Palestinian one. 
For Hamas, the central issue remains its determination 
to obtain recognition of its right to govern pursuant to 
the mandate it obtained in the January legislative 
elections and acquire the resources to meet this 
challenge. Its 9 June renunciation of the unilateral 
ceasefire (or “quiet”, tahdi’a) proclaimed in March 2005, 
and actions since then, were designed as a message, 
not only to Israel, but equally to its Palestinian rivals 
and foreign adversaries. The point is that if Hamas is 
either removed from power or prevented from governing, 
it retains other options and will not shy away from 
exercising them.2 These are priorities on which the 
entire Hamas leadership, irrespective of any internal 
differences and rivalries, remains united.3 
 
 
1 Crisis Group Middle East Report N°54, Palestinians, Israel 
and the Quartet: Pulling Back from the Brink, 13 June 2006. 
2 See further Gareth Evans and Robert Malley “How to Curb 
the Tension in Gaza”, Financial Times, 6 July 2006. 
3 Crisis Group interviews, Musa Abu Marzouk Deputy 
Secretary General of the Hamas Politbureau, Damascus, 11 
July 2006. “The abduction of a soldier and the Qassam strikes 
on Ashkelon are just political messages from Hamas. They are 
not a full-scale return to the resistance. They are carefully 
calibrated steps. We haven’t returned to war. Don’t kid 
yourself that the wall stopped us. We can attack wherever we 
want in Israel. If Hamas has nothing, no other option, we 
could conduct a scorched earth policy, not a calibrated 
approach. You do the first when you’re weak and desperate. 
 
 
The second when you’re strong”. Crisis Group interview, 
Salah Bardawil, Hamas parliamentarian and spokesman, Khan 
Yunis Refugee Camp, Gaza Strip, 10 July 2006.  
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The Palestinian National Conciliation Document 
On 25 June all Palestinian political movements in the occupied territories with the exception of Islamic Jihad signed an 
agreement known as the National Conciliation Document. Consisting of a preamble and eighteen articles, it is based upon and 
closely reflects the Prisoners’ Initiative unveiled on 11 May.  
The National Conciliation Document’s primary purpose is to unify Palestinian positions regarding the role and function of 
national institutions, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and relations with the outside world. More specifically, it seeks to 
resolve what had become an increasingly violent struggle between Hamas and Fatah that commenced after Hamas won the 
January elections and in March took control of the PA government. 
Its main points include:  
 Identification of a Palestinian state in all territory occupied by Israel in 1967 and the Palestinian right of return as 
rights in accordance with “international law” and “international legitimacy”. The wording is virtually identical to that 
of the Prisoners’ Initiative and constitutes a concession by Hamas, both because it implies a two-state settlement and 
because the Islamists previously resisted recognition of international legitimacy on the grounds that this constituted 
recognition of Israel. In two respects, however, the document hardens the content of the Prisoners’ Initiative: it 
accepts international law and legitimacy but “without detracting from our people’s rights”; and it calls for the right of 
return of refugees to their “homes and properties from which they were expelled”. 
 Confirmation of existing agreements to integrate Hamas and Islamic Jihad into the ranks of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) by the end of 2006. The document refers to the PLO as the Palestinian 
people’s “sole legitimate representative” and “highest political authority”, longstanding formulations that 
had previously been resisted by the Islamists. It also confirms the PLO and Palestinian Authority (PA) 
President Abbas as responsible for the “management of negotiations”. Any agreement is to be ratified either by 
the Palestinian National Council emerging from the new PLO or through a referendum held “in the 
homeland and all places of exile”. 
 Affirmation of the Palestinian “right to resist the occupation”, while pledging to “concentrate the resistance in the 
territories occupied in 1967, alongside political action and negotiations and diplomatic work”. The wording reflects 
the Prisoners’ Initiative but is considered a concession to Hamas, which rejected efforts by President Abbas that would 
limit rather than concentrate Palestinian resistance within the occupied territories. 
 Formation of a PA coalition government on the basis of “a joint program designed to alleviate the Palestinian 
situation locally, at the inter-Arab level, regionally and internationally…and that enjoys Palestinian popular and 
political support from all groups, as well as Arab and international support”. 
The National Conciliation Document does not explicitly provide for recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence or 
endorsement of existing Palestinian commitments – the three demands put forth by the Quartet4 as conditions for a renewal 
of relations with the PA government. Nevertheless, it represents a considerable development in Hamas’s positions. As a 




4 The Quartet on the Middle East is comprised of representatives of the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United 
Nations. 
5 Crisis Group telephone interview, 24 July 2006. 
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A. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS 
In mid-June, the key issue was the crisis engendered by 
President Abbas’s 25 May ultimatum to Hamas to accept 
the Prisoners’ Initiative unconditionally. That document, 
signed by prominent Palestinian detainees including a 
senior Hamas figure, was the most visible effort to date to 
achieve a national consensus on relations, both among 
Palestinians and between them, Israel and the international 
community. Amid growing violence and assassinations 
increasingly likened to an incipient civil war, Abbas on 
10 June issued a presidential decree proclaiming the 
referendum would be conducted on 26 July.6  
Abbas’s strategy was straightforward: to pull the rug from 
under Hamas’s electoral mandate by reconfirming his 
own in a referendum victory large enough to empower 
him to change or dismiss the PA government. The gambit 
appeared to present itself quite well at first, as polls 
showed overwhelming support for the Prisoners’ Initiative, 
and Abbas as well as Fatah seemed poised for the first 
time since the parliamentary elections to regain the 
political initiative. 
What has happened since? For one, the gambit quickly 
ran into formidable obstacles. There were obvious 
constitutional difficulties but the political ones were more 
important. Once the document ceased being a forum for 
national reconciliation and consensus and turned into an 
instrument in the Fatah/Hamas tug of war, its Islamist 
signatories withdrew their endorsement, criticising Abbas 
for his “unacceptable abuse” of it;7 popular support for the 
referendum plummeted; and Abbas signalled he was 
having second thoughts. 
While surveys continued to suggest a clear majority in 
support of the Prisoners’ Initiative, the public was more 
divided about how it would vote.8 Some of Abbas’s 
advisers continued to plead with him to move forward 
with the referendum no matter what, arguing that to give 
it up would be to lose credibility and whatever political 
leverage he still possessed. “If the choice is between an 
agreement with Hamas and a referendum, Abbas should 
 
 
6 For background, analysis, and the text of the Prisoners’ 
Initiative, see Crisis Group Report, Pulling Back from the Brink, 
op. cit.  
7 “Hamas author of Prisoners’ Document withdraws his 
name”, Associated Press, 11 June 2006. 
8 According to a series of polls conducted between 27 May 
and 24 June 2006, support for the Prisoners’ Initiative 
declined from 85 to 64 per cent and for a referendum from 
81 to 58 per cent. See further www.neareastconsulting.com.  
go for the referendum. It is our last chance to regain the 
political initiative. Without it, we are lost”.9  
But the president, never seeming fully at ease in his 
new, confrontational role, appears to have felt otherwise. 
Instead, he heeded the advice of those who underscored 
the risky nature of any confrontation with Hamas. In the 
words of a Fatah Revolutionary Council member:  
If there is a collapse, Hamas can make everyone 
collapse. They can undermine everything. We 
should reach an agreement. What are our options? 
A coup, which is suicide; to form an underground 
organisation, which will lead to civil war; send 
people to demonstrations, which will achieve 
nothing; or join a coalition. We should recognise 
that the only way to reach authority is through the 
democratic process.10 
Travelling to Gaza, where Fatah sentiment for an 
understanding with Hamas ran stronger,11 Abbas 
negotiated with Prime Minister Ismail Haniya on the 
exact wording of the Prisoners’ Initiative to see if he 
could meet Hamas’s objections and obviate the 
referendum. For its own reasons, Hamas was equally 
interested in reaching agreement and presenting a united 
stance toward the international boycott. According to 
Hamas leader Salah Bardawil, “we are and since the 
beginning have been serious about a national unity 
government. We want to alleviate the pressure on 
Hamas”.12 
Throughout June, the National Dialogue intensified. One 
problem was with the document’s language. According to 
Fatah Central Committee member Abbas Zaki, there were 
three issues: the role of the PLO and how it would be 
expanded to include Hamas and others; what was meant 
by adherence to international legitimacy; and the character 
of a national unity government.13 But an even bigger 
problem was what would follow agreement. While Abbas 
initially had claimed that governmental adoption of the 
 
 
9 Crisis Group interview, PA presidential adviser, Ramallah, 
June 2006. 
10 Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, 25 June 2006. 
11 Fatah leaders in Gaza face a far more difficult task given the 
Islamists’ strength. They are said to have argued for a 
compromise over the objection of some West Bank advisers. 
Crisis Group interviews, Ramallah, Gaza, June-July 2006. 
According to Hamas leaders, in fact, their nemesis Muhammad 
Dahlan was a key figure promoting agreement. Crisis Group 
interviews, Ahmad Bahar, leader of the Hamas parliamentary 
faction in the Gaza Strip, Gaza City, 10 July 2006; Salah 
Bardawil, Hamas parliamentarian and spokesman, Khan Yunis 
Refugee Camp, Gaza Strip, 10 July 2006. 
12 Crisis Group interview, Bardawil, 10 July 2006. 
13 Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, 13 July 2006. 
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Prisoners’ Initiative would trigger a new international 
attitude toward the PA, Washington clearly signalled it 
would not: 
They told us we could do what we wanted with 
the Prisoners’ Initiative, with a national unity 
government or what not. They don’t care. What 
matter are the three Quartet conditions. If those 
are not met, the boycott will remain.14  
As a result, some Fatah officials suggested that agreement 
regarding the Prisoners’ Initiative would immediately 
lead to negotiations over a government platform that – 
unlike the Prisoners’ Initiative – would meet the Quartet 
conditions.15 For Hamas, that plainly was unacceptable. 
“What do you think? We are going to negotiate for 
weeks over a document that, once signed, will be put 
aside as we then negotiate over more stringent conditions? 
We won’t accept moving targets. If we reach agreement, 
it’s up to Abbas to deliver his pledge of a different 
international approach”.16 
On 25 June, agreement finally was reached, and both 
sides expressed satisfaction with the outcome – though 
whether consensus had been found on the government’s 
composition or platform is another matter. In Abbas 
Zaki’s words, “we now have agreement. Yet it is not 
the text that matters, but how it is interpreted. The 
danger now is that we will have different readings of 
the same words, and this will be determined by the 
intention of the parties rather than the meaning of the 
words”.17 Meanwhile, tit-for-tat killings orchestrated 
by gunmen allied to Fatah and Hamas continued, 
albeit on a lesser scale. 
In the event, such deliberations were wholly overshadowed 
by developments on the Israeli-Palestinian front. Hours 
before the Fatah/Hamas agreement was signed, a group 
of militant groups mounted a successful attack on 
Kerem Shalom. So long as the crisis resulting from it 
remains unresolved, and Israel continues its military 
operations, there will be no coalition government. 
According to a Hamas leader, “Fatah doesn’t want to 
enter government. It’s not eager to align itself with a 
besieged movement condemned as a terrorist 
organisation”.18 Faced with a common enemy returning to 




14 Crisis Group interview, presidential adviser, Ramallah, 24 
June 2006. 
15 Crisis Group interviews, Ramallah, June 2006. 
16 Crisis Group interview, Hamas official, Ramallah, 24 June 2006. 
17 Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, 13 July 2006. 
18 Crisis Group interview, Bardawil, 10 July 2006. 
B. ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DEVELOPMENTS 
Although Hamas and other Palestinian organisations 
announced a unilateral ceasefire in March 2005, 
armed conflict never came to a halt. Israel refused to 
negotiate a reciprocal and comprehensive cessation of 
hostilities. Neither the PA nor Hamas took effective 
steps to end the launching of rockets by others; the truce 
was rejected by the Popular Resistance Committees, a 
militia based in the southern Gaza Strip; and Islamic 
Jihad over time gave an increasingly liberal interpretation 
to the right of reprisal it insisted on retaining. 
By mid-2006, mutual attacks had become an almost 
daily occurrence. Palestinian militants routinely bombarded 
Sderot and other Israeli communities near the Gaza 
Strip with crude, short-range local rockets generically 
dubbed Qassams. Israel regularly bombarded the Gaza 
Strip with artillery and conducted air strikes there and 
assassinations in the West Bank with growing 
frequency. Simultaneously, it continued its territorial 
isolation of the occupied territories, and the Gaza Strip 
in particular, virtually without interruption, inflicting 
massive economic damage on the Palestinian economy. 
After the new Palestinian government assumed office 
on 29 March, Israel also interrupted monthly transfers 
of Palestinian revenues it collected on the PA’s behalf.  
The above notwithstanding, until June 2006 Hamas was 
virtually absent from the battlefield. And while Israel 
continued to arrest Hamas members and militants in the 
West Bank, 19 it refrained from anything resembling the 
comprehensive campaigns against the Islamist movement 
of previous years.  
A first notable change occurred on 9 June. Early that 
morning, Israel assassinated Popular Resistance Committee 
leader Jamal Abu-Samhadana, who had shortly before 
been appointed commander of a new PA security force 
controlled by the interior minister and who was accused 
of involvement in lethal acts against Israelis and 
Americans, as well as senior Hamas leader Said Siam. 
That same afternoon, seven members of the Ghalia family 
were killed in what Palestinians and most foreign 
observers are convinced was an Israeli naval bombardment 
 
 
19 During the second half of 2005, for example, Israel arrested 
many of the Islamist movement’s candidates for the January 
2006 legislative elections, including Finance Minister Omar 
Abd-al-Raziq, Muhammad Ghazal (who had been responsible 
for proclaiming Hamas’s participation in the elections) and 
Shaikh Hasan Yusif (considered one of the movement’s leading 
pragmatists). The 7 October 2005 Jerusalem Post reported that 
200 Hamas members had been recently arrested in the West 
Bank as part of Israel’s Operation First Rain.  
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of a Gaza beach.20 That evening, the Izz al-Din Qassam 
Brigades, the Hamas military wing, renounced the March 
2005 ceasefire and launched several Qassam rockets 
toward southern Israel.21  
In the following weeks, Hamas resumed rocket attacks on 
Israel, firing improved versions from areas further 
north evacuated by Israel in August 2005 and hitting 
the city of Ashkelon. Israel shelled Qassam launch 
sites with thousands of rounds of artillery fire and 
resumed targeting Hamas militants in the Gaza Strip. 
With growing frequency, its air force also targeted 
heavily populated areas and private homes where 
militants were presumed to be, leading to a visible 
surge in civilian casualties. According to the UN, 100 
Palestinians (including sixteen children) and one Israeli 
soldier were killed between 28 June and 18 July.22 
Operation Dispelled Illusion was the most dramatic 
development. On 25 June, a squad drawn from three 
groups – the Popular Resistance Committees, Qassam 
Brigades and the heretofore unknown Army of Islam – 
perpetrated one of the most sophisticated attacks since 
the 2000 uprising began. Tunnelling more than half a 
kilometre under the Gaza-Israel border to the military 
base of Kerem Shalom, within Israel at the south-eastern 
tip of the Gaza Strip, the militants blew up a tank, killed 
two soldiers and captured a third, Corporal Gilad Shalit.  
Much speculation has centred on the timing and purpose. 
Many pointed the finger not so much at Hamas as at 
the leader of its Damascus-based Politbureau, Khaled 
Mashal.23 According to this view, he ordered the attack in 
order to undermine the Islamist leadership within the 
occupied territories, and the PA government in particular, 
which was on the verge of signing the National 
 
 
20 An internal investigation by the Israeli military concluded that 
the killings of the Ghalia family could not have been caused by 
its forces. According to Lucy Mair of Human Rights Watch, 
“The IDF is inherently incapable of investigating itself on such 
a sensitive issue. Our own investigation team, which included a 
senior former military officer, concluded that until proven 
otherwise Israel must be considered the responsible party. The 
reason we cannot yet offer a definitive conclusion is because we 
don’t have access to Israeli troops, weaponry and other vital 
information from the Israeli side. For this reason we continue to 
call for an independent investigation”. Crisis Group interview, 
Jerusalem, 13 July 2006. 
21 For background and analysis see Crisis Group Report, 
Pulling Back from the Brink, op. cit. 
22 “Situation Report: Gaza Strip, 18 July”, United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, at www.ochaopt.org. It is not entirely clear 
if these figures also include West Bank casualties. 
23 The view seems to have particular resonance among Israeli 
and U.S. officials and analysts. Crisis Group interviews, Tel 
Aviv, Washington, July 2006.  
Conciliation Document with Fatah. His ostensible purpose 
was to sabotage the agreement, undermine the government, 
and more broadly escalate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
He thus sought to reassert his supremacy within the 
movement and promote the agenda of his radical 
patrons in Damascus and Tehran in one fell swoop. In 
the words of a Palestinian presidential adviser the day 
after the attack, “It’s Hamas against Hamas. It’s so 
clear it was ordered by Mashal and that he wants to 
undermine the people inside”.24 A Fatah spokesperson 
went so far as to claim that “our problem in Fatah is with 
Mashal and not with Hamas. We can easily get an 
agreement with Hamas, but Mashal is refusing any 
compromise”.25  
That differences exist between various Hamas leaders is 
beyond doubt. In meetings in Ramallah, Gaza, Damascus 
and Beirut over the past several months, Crisis Group 
heard different tones and emphases; most recently, 
ministers in Ramallah appeared more focused on 
governance than those in Damascus. Prisoners have 
specific views as well. But conventional interpretations 
of the motivations behind Hamas’s attack simply do not 
hold.  
Unsurprisingly, Hamas deputy Politbureau leader Musa 
Abu Marzuq dismissed suggestions that the attack 
was ordered from Damascus, stating that “the political 
leadership has no relationship with how the military 
implements the movement’s decisions on the ground. 
The military command deals with the situation according 
to purely military considerations”.26 But there are other, 
persuasive reasons to doubt the prevailing view. To 
begin, if the goal was to deter Prime Minister Ismail 
Haniya from signing the agreement, it clearly failed. 
Unless one believes that he could have taken a decision 
against the wishes of the external leadership – something 
that would be at odds with all that is known about the 
organisation’s decision-making process – this strongly 
undermines the conventional view. As the leader of 
Hamas’s parliamentary faction, Salah Bardawil put it:  
Haniya cannot control policies alone, nor can 
Mashal control the military alone. The military 
wing reflects political trends. If Mashal opposed 
the Consultative Council, they’d expel him. We’re 
 
 
24 Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, 26 June 2006. 
25 “There are big differences in Hamas between the political and 
military wing. Qassam leaders Ahmad Jabari and Muhammad 
Daif are not taking orders from Haniya. Haniya knows nothing 
about Shalit, and Mashal has captured power in his hands; he 
takes the military decisions, the political decisions, the 
organisational ones. He has the money, and he has direct contact 
with people on the ground”. Crisis Group interview, Abd-al-
Hakim Awad, Fatah activist, Gaza City, 10 July 2006. 
26 Crisis Group interview, Damascus, 11 July 2006. 
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not like Fatah with its lack of leadership. The Kerem 
Shalom attack was not intended to scupper the 
National Conciliation Agreement, but rather to 
accelerate the negotiations. It put pressure on Abbas 
to sign. After the attack, he backed off from insisting 
on amendments and on concessions to the Israeli 
and U.S. position, and the parties agreed to sign.27 
Members of the external leadership described in detail to 
Crisis Group in the days prior to the attack what changes 
they needed in the document for it to meet Hamas’s 
approval;28 the final version reflects most of those 
alterations and, indeed, no one among that leadership has 
criticised Haniya for signing it. To the contrary, in 
interviews with Crisis Group in Damascus, the 
movement’s deputy leader, Musa Abu Marzuq, and its 
Lebanon representative, Usama Hamdan, both praised 
the agreement.29 It also is noteworthy that those same 
people – members of Fatah, Israeli officials and others – 
who evoke a fight between a pragmatic Haniya and the 
more radical external wing were, not long ago, speaking 
of a tug-of-war between a hard-line Haniya beholden to 
Damascus and more moderate Islamist leaders in the 
West Bank.30  
In fact, the timing of the attack may well have been 
coincidental. According to Palestinian analyst George 
Giacaman, “Israel has stated it knew of a tunnel’s 
existence for several months. Two days before the 
attack, it arrested two Palestinians inside the Gaza 
Strip involved in the attack’s preparation, precipitating a 
speedy implementation out of fear they would talk”.31  
Ultimately, while there is little reason to suspect that 
the Hamas-led government had prior knowledge of 
the attack or that the cabinet felt its success suited the 
government’s purposes,32 the reasons behind the 
 
 
27 Crisis Group interview, 10 July 2006. Fatah Revolutionary 
Council member Qaddura Faris concurred: “I don’t buy the 
argument that Mashal is Hamas’s commander in chief, directing 
the actions of the military wing. He simply can’t do it”. Crisis 
Group interview, Ramallah, 6 July 2006. 
28 Crisis Group interviews, Beirut, 22-23 July 2006. 
29 Crisis Group interviews, Abu Marzuq, 11 July 2006; 
Hamdan, 14 July. 
30 Crisis Group Report, Pulling Back From the Brink, op. 
cit., p 18, n. 132. 
31 Crisis Group interview, Ramallah, 7 July 2006. A slightly 
different perspective was provided by PA Deputy Prime 
Minister Nasir-al-Din Sha’ir: “Israel had kidnapped two of our 
people from Gaza, the people felt provoked, and wanted to 
demonstrate that we can do the same”. Crisis Group interview, 
Ramallah, 26 June 2006. 
32 Deputy Prime Minister Sha’ir shortly after the attack in fact 
told a Ramallah press conference, “I demand that this Israeli 
soldier be freed immediately”, Associated Press, 28 June 2006. 
resurgence of violence are plain and predictable. Hamas 
was running the risk of showing itself unable to manage 
Palestinian affairs, gradually losing its constituents’ 
confidence and support. By striking, it hoped to force 
domestic and foreign parties to give the government 
breathing space or bring the whole house down. 
Differences of opinion within the movement aside, 
the consensus within the organisation increasingly 
tilted toward the latter contingency.33 Barring a change in 
Israeli, international and Fatah attitudes toward 
Hamas, violence was a reaction waiting to happen. 
“The U.S. and Israel have no right to prevent the 
Palestinian people from choosing their leadership, this 
issue concerns the Palestinian people and is not 
subject to negotiation or concession”, said Abu Marzuq34 
The same words were spoken by Haniya, almost 
verbatim, in his 21 July Friday sermon. 
Views within Hamas also converged regarding how to 
resolve the crisis. Leaders in Gaza interviewed by Crisis 
Group were dismissive of Egyptian proposals for the 
sequential release first of the Israeli soldier and then of 
an unspecified number of Palestinian prisoners to be 
discussed with President Abbas, rather than a 
simultaneous exchange of named detainees for which 
Hamas could take credit. According to Ahmad Bahar, a 
prominent Islamist parliamentarian, “we cannot accept a 
prior release of the soldier on the understanding that 
Israel would then release our prisoners. We had such 
understandings with Israel in the past and Israel reneged 
on its word”.35  
When asked for his view on a resolution of the crisis, the 
Damascus-based leader immediately referred to the 
initiative unveiled by Haniya in Gaza the previous day: 
“quiet, a reciprocal ceasefire and negotiations about the 
question of the captive soldier. It was immediately 
rejected. The Quartet needs to very carefully and seriously 




33 Crisis Group interview, Hamas members and officials, 
Beirut, Ramallah, June 2005. 
34 He added: “The Quartet did not give Hamas an opportunity to 
deal with anything. Within three minutes of its electoral 
victory, a number of officials convened at Davos with Solana 
at their head and talked about boycotting the Palestinians, 
while the U.S. and Israeli immediately did this. The Quartet 
did not even give Hamas the customary 100 days to learn 
about its program and policies; instead it immediately 
announced its boycott and siege”. Crisis Group interview, 
Abu Marzuq, Damascus, 11 July 2006. 
35 The sentiments were echoed by Bardawil. Crisis Group 
interview, Gaza City, 10 July 2006. 
36 Ibid. 
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In its first reaction to the soldier’s abduction, the Israeli 
government held not only Hamas, but the PA and Abbas 
responsible and rapidly launched an assault on multiple 
fronts. These included assassinations of Hamas and 
other militants; arrests of PA cabinet ministers, Hamas 
parliamentarians and other Islamist leaders in the West 
Bank; attacks on key civilian infrastructure in the Gaza 
Strip, such as the main power plant, the main bridge in 
central Gaza and PA offices; tightening of the economic 
isolation; and major armed thrusts into the Gaza Strip 
for the first time since August 2005.  
C. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
Despite relatively promising developments on the 
domestic Palestinian front, and alarming ones on the 
Israeli-Palestinian one, the Quartet has not deviated from 
the position it staked out immediately upon Hamas’s 
victory, embodied in the three conditions for lifting the 
diplomatic and financial boycott.37 It has continued to 
hone its work on a mechanism to partially respond to 
the humanitarian crisis. On 17 June, it approved the 
establishment, for an initial three months, of a Temporary 
International Mechanism formulated by the EU to assist 
the Palestinians while bypassing the PA government.38 On 
23 June the European Commission approved a contribution 
of €105 million to finance its various “windows”. Almost 
half this amount, €40 million, was dedicated to payment 
of “allowances to individuals. This covers a contribution 
to the payment of social allowances to those who are 
providing care in hospitals and clinics and social 
allowances to those in greatest need”.39 Coordination is 
to be through the PA presidency rather than government. 
The formula was intended to meet American demands 
that nothing akin to salary payments to any PA employees 
occur so long as Hamas remains in power and fails to 
meet the Quartet preconditions. While a step in the 
right direction, the result is an awkward arrangement 
that risks exacerbating internal tensions between the 
presidency and government and falls far short of 
meeting basic needs. According to an EU official involved 
in implementation:  
We have technical contacts with the PA, but refer 
all matters to the president’s office, which acts as the 
facilitator and provides the necessary information. 
The president’s office does not channel funds. We 
 
 
37 For background and analysis see Crisis Group Report, 
Pulling Back from the Brink, op. cit.  
38 Ibid.  
39 “EU contributes €105 million to the Temporary International 
Mechanism for the Palestinians”, 23 June 2006, EU press 
release at http://europa.eu.int.  
define the criteria. We will pay all doctors and health 
workers. But we don’t know whether by 1 September 
we will be able to pay teachers.40  
Timeframes for full implementation are being postponed; 
the initial disbursement by the European Commission was 
limited to health workers; and agreement on the criteria to 
qualify for basic needs financial support remains 
undetermined. It is hard to see how any of this is 
contributing to the Quartet’s proclaimed goals: to moderate 
Hamas, strengthen President Abbas, and create conditions 
for quiet and political progress.  
Of late, there have been some encouraging albeit early 
signs of an evolution on Europe’s – and more broadly the 
Quartet’s – part.41 This stems partially from growing 
perception that the Quartet’s position is not having the 
desired effect. Moreover, the Lebanese flare-up has 
concentrated EU minds, convincing some policy-makers of 
the dangers of violence and radicalisation on two fronts 
simultaneously and of the possible snow-ball effect.42 
Wisely, some EU officials have concluded that lumping 
Hamas and Hizbollah together would not serve Europe’s 
interests: it would make both crises harder to resolve, risk 
regionalising the conflict, solidify the perception of a 
Western war against Islam and therefore undermine efforts 
to promote the political evolution of militant Islamism.43 
Addressing Hamas is, in this view, the less complicated 
of the two challenges, involving narrower issues and, from 
Israel’s perspective, posing less of an immediate security 
threat.  
As a result, some in Brussels and other European capitals 
are advocating a more nuanced policy toward Hamas, 
premised first on decoupling it conceptually from 
Hizbollah and secondly on reaching some kind of realistic 
accommodation with the Palestinian government. An EU 
official suggested that if a national unity government were 
formed on the basis of the Prisoners’ Initiative, included 
one or two “reputable members” in key ministries and 
maintained an effective ceasefire (perhaps with third party 
monitoring), this – though admittedly falling short of the 
three conditions – might well constitute a sufficient basis 
for a fundamental re-evaluation of EU policy toward the 
PA, even, perhaps, over Washington’s objections.44  
 
 
40 Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, 7 July 2006. 
41 In mid-July, the Arab League transferred some $50 million to 
Abbas’s office, without Quartet objection, providing for the 
payment of about a half-month’s salary to all PA workers, 
including the security sector, in mid-July. Crisis Group 
interview, planning ministry official, Ramallah, July 2006.  
42 Crisis Group interview, EU official, Brussels, July 2006 
43 Ibid. 
44 Crisis Group interview, EU official, Brussels, July 2006. 
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III. THE VIEW FROM LEBANON 
With heavier fire-power, wider international implications 
and greater potential for regional escalation, the fighting 
on Israel’s northern border quickly took centre stage. 
For many outside observers, it also raised far more 
questions, including why Hizbollah had launched its 
attack, and why now. An important starting point must 
be its worldview and split identity as well as events that 
have affected Lebanon over the past several years. 
A.  LEBANON, HIZBOLLAH AND THE RISKS 
OF INTERNATIONALISATION 
In December 2005, Crisis Group warned against the 
gathering storm in Lebanon. The message was 
straightforward: international involvement was needed 
but, if poorly managed, risked promoting instability and, 
worse, bringing the country to breaking point: 
There is a potentially explosive combination of 
renewed sectarian anxiety born of the collapse of 
the Syrian-sponsored system, intense regional 
competition and almost unprecedented foreign 
involvement….Groups are lining up behind 
competing visions for Lebanon and the region’s 
confessional and ideological future. Domestic 
politics is being dragged into wider contests, 
while foreign actors are being pulled into 
Lebanon’s domestic struggles.45  
At the time, Crisis Group recommended a two-track 
approach: bolstering the central government by assisting 
in long-overdue political and economic reform, while 
putting on hold more ambitious agendas such as disarming 
Hizbollah through implementation of Resolution 1559 
or seeking to isolate and destabilise the Syrian regime. 
That road was not taken. Instead, precious little was 
done to strengthen the Siniora government or de-
confessionalise the political system; much was made – 
rhetorically at least – of the need to implement 1559’s 
disarmament provisions, and the U.S. continued to 
ostracise Syria, leading it to view all Lebanese events 
through the prism of Washington’s efforts to weaken its 
regime. Tensions over Iran’s nuclear file and growing 
regional Sunni-Shiite hostility prompted by the Iraq war 
added to the volatile mix, given Tehran’s close ties to 




45 Crisis Group Middle East Report N°48, Lebanon: Managing 
the Gathering Storm, 5 December 2005, p. i. 
Enter, then, Hizbollah. Making sense of the movement 
is a challenging, and, as contradictory interpretations of 
the past weeks’ events illustrate, uncertain science. 
Crucially, it must be apprehended as a multi-dimensional 
organisation, constantly juggling diverse constituencies, 
interests and outlooks. At any given time, one of those 
identities will predominate; at no time will any of them 
fade away. 
At bottom, Hizbollah is a Shiite movement, indeed 
the Shiites’ prime organisational asset in a country 
long reserved primarily for Christian and Sunni Muslim 
interests. It is also a national movement, intent on 
demonstrating cross-confessional appeal as the only 
effective defender of the country’s security, but it also 
possesses, critically, a regional identity, being closely 
tied to and, in some respects, dependent on Syria and 
Iran. In a sense, Hizbollah is revolutionary Iran’s 
proudest achievement, the result of a two-decade long, 
billions of dollars investment. And it is an intensely 
ideological movement, holding to a revolutionary, 
internationalist Islamist creed, intent since Israel’s 2000 
withdrawal on expanding its role to the Palestinian 
arena, all of which made one Lebanese commentator 
dub it “Islamism’s Trostkyites”.46 Hizbollah’s success 
stems from its remarkable ability to take advantage of 
the country’s political system and its tragic civil war 
to give a pan-Islamist revolutionary idea Lebanese roots.  
Since Israel’s 2000 withdrawal, these strands have come 
into increased tension with each another. At one level, 
the development removed a principal Hizbollah cause 
and pushed it toward a more national, political role. 
There was evidence: greater involvement in the political 
process, climaxing in the unprecedented decision to 
participate in the new government. Other events – the 
Hariri assassination and ensuing reshuffle of the nation’s 
political deck; Syria’s departure; and renewed emphasis 
on Resolution 1559 – led the movement to fall back on 
the Shiite community and assert its role as defender of 
its interests in an environment marked by heightened 
domestic and regional sectarian divides. The link with 
1559 was clear; if Hizbollah disarmament was to be put 
on the table, so too should broader issues concerning the 
sectarian distribution of power and political representation. 
Crisis Group wrote that the message was: “come after 
the weapons, and Hizbollah will go after the fragile 
political balance”.47 
Regional evolutions also played their part. With a 
weakened Syria, Western pressures on Iran, the Iraq 
war, 1559 and the emergence of a more Western-
 
 
46 Crisis Group interview, Lebanese analyst, July 2006. 
47 Crisis Group Report, Managing the Gathering Storm, op. 
cit., p. 19. 
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friendly government in Beirut, Hizbollah leaders saw an 
effort to radically – and from its perspective menacingly – 
shift the regional balance of power. Here, ideological 
interests were at stake; to some in the leadership, the 
paramount consideration was how to prevent this outcome. 
Lebanon, because it was at the intersection of so many 
regional issues, and its political identity was in flux, was 
a significant piece in this strategic puzzle. Hizbollah was 
determined to prevent the country from becoming a 
springboard for what it saw as a concerted attempt to 
reshape the region to the U.S.’s benefit. 
The result is a flurry of apparent contradictions. 
Hizbollah gradually has been evolving toward a more 
mundane political organisation, and justification for its 
weapons ring increasingly hollow; yet its leaders cling 
to the dominant paradigm of “resistance” (muqawama). 
The movement has joined the government and is ever 
more present in the political system; yet, at the same 
time, it increasingly perceives that system as tainted 
from the inside, as several of its actors side with the 
external enemy. More and more, Hizbollah is viewed as a 
sectarian organisation partaking in the banal apportionment 
of resources along confessional lines; yet it remains 
determined to maintain its image as a national movement 
and is as committed as ever to its revolutionary agenda. 
And while the confrontation with Israel had become 
more muted, it considered the dangers for the region 
were becoming greater. Whatever reasons existed for 
Hizbollah to transition toward a purely political party, 
more than enough reasons were pushing it the other way.  
Only by keeping these many and sometimes conflicting 
dimensions in mind can one begin to make sense of 
Hizbollah’s actions and thinking in the recent crisis. 
B. WHY THE ATTACK? 
At an immediate level, Hizbollah launched its operation 
for the most banal reason of all: because it could. There 
was, in this, very little that was new. Hizbollah had 
called 2006 “the year of retrieving the prisoners”,48 and, for 
many months, Hassan Nasrallah had publicly proclaimed 
the movement’s intention of seizing soldiers for the 
purpose of a prisoner exchange. In November 2005, he 
spoke of the “duty to capture Israeli soldiers and swap 
them for the Arab prisoners in Israel”49 and, in April 
2006, he had threatened to get back the most notorious, 
Samir Kuntar, even by force; a previous prisoner 
exchange in 2004 had not included Kuntar because 
Hizbollah was unable to provide information on Ron 
 
 
48 Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, “Hezbollah’s Apocalypse Now”, 
The Washington Post, 23 July 2006.  
49 The Daily Star, 26 November 2005. 
Arad, an Israeli soldier who went missing in action.50 
For some time Israeli officials had been warning that the 
Islamist movement would try to carry out such an 
operation. And, indeed, there had been several attempts 
in the past – eleven according to Nabih Berri, the 
speaker of parliament51 – of which the best known took 
place in November 2005 and was foiled by Israel. 
Speculation that the attack was timed to coincide with 
Iran’s rejection of the nuclear deal52 appears, in this 
light, questionable. 
For Nasrallah, this was a matter of honour and of 
keeping his word. Tellingly, the operation was dubbed 
“The Sincere Promise” (al-Wa’d al-Sadiq), a reference 
to the pledge made to Lebanese and Arab prisoners, 
chiefly Samir Kuntar and Yehia Sqaf.53 And, immediately 
after the capture, Nasrallah plainly stated: “For more 
than a year, I’ve been saying that we want to kidnap 
soldiers in order to exchange prisoners. Every time I said 
so, Israel went into high alert along the border. We decided 
to kidnap soldiers in order to end the matter of prisoners”.54  
The conflagration began with what, from Hizbollah’s 
perspective, was just another in a history of bloody 
tit-for-tats, many instances of which go unreported. It 
was, to be sure, more audacious and provocative, in 
that it occurred not in the contested Shebaa but in a 
non-contested area to the West, where Israeli vigilance 
was far lower, but not fundamentally different in its 
objectives.55 As their leaders saw it, it would provoke 
another round of fighting, intense perhaps but contained, 
and revert to the traditional paradigm of prisoner swaps.56  
 
 
50 The Jerusalem Post, 22 January 2006. Israel has refused to 
release Kuntar, whom it convicted of infiltrating the Israeli 
coastal town of Nahariya in 1979 by sea and killing two 
civilians and a policeman, until it receives information about 
Ron Arad, an Israeli airforce officer missing in action since 
October 1986. Kuntar, a Lebanese Druze, was a member not of 
Hizbollah, which did not exist at the time, but of the Palestine 
Liberation Front (PLF), a pro-Iraqi PLO faction led by the late 
Abu Abbas. Other members of the group who participated in 
the operation were released in a 1985 exchange between Israel 
and the PFLP-GC. 
51 as-Safir, 17 July 2006. 
52 Crisis Group interviews with UN and EU officials, 
Brussels, New York, July 2006. 
53 There are approximately 9,850 Arab prisoners in Israeli 
jails. Report published by the Palestinian Ministry of 
Detainee Affairs, 18 July 2006. There are three Lebanese, 
about a hundred other Arabs, and the rest Palestinian. 
54 Press conference, 12 July 2006. 
55 Crisis Group interview, Hizbollah officials and members, 
Beirut, July 2006. 
56 Crisis Group interviews, Hizbollah members, Beirut, July 
2006. In January 2004, under a German-mediated prisoner 
swap, Elhanan Tannenbaum, an Israeli businessman and the 
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Timing also reflected other key considerations. As 
discussed, Hizbollah was under relative stress, concerned 
about domestic developments and steps to curb its 
military potential, but most importantly intent on 
reasserting the “importance of its resistance and of its 
unrivalled efficacy as a deterrent to a threat posed by 
Israel”.57 Even the less aggressive Israeli response 
Hizbollah expected would have made its case, establishing 
once more that the movement is the only Lebanese actor 
capable of hurting the enemy and, when attacked, of 
defending the country. The concurrence with Hamas’s 
abduction of an Israeli soldier and Israel’s harsh 
response rendered this all the more appealing, for it 
allowed Hizbollah to reclaim the mantle of an Arab-
Islamic force transcending both its Lebanese and Shiite 
identities.  
The fight, for Nasrallah in particular, always is about 
broader revolutionary, political objectives. As he explained 
in his al-Jazeera interview: “Hizbollah is fighting for 
the sake of Lebanon. Yes, the result of this battle will 
be seen in Palestine”. Regarding Sunni/Shiite strife in 
particular, Nasrallah explained: “One of the more 
important results of this war is that, with regard to the 
Sunni/Shiite issue, it fortified the Arab and Islamic 
world against attempts to play on this issue…Today, 
we are Shiites fighting Israel”.58 
Nor should one underestimate the regional angle. 
Although there is no evidence that either Syria or Iran 
directly ordered the attack – and, operationally, 
considerable doubt that they could do so – it is difficult to 
imagine it taking place over their objections. The timing 
was, in this sense, wholly consistent with the mindset 
in both countries which, each for its own reason but 
both because they were under pressure, thought they 
might benefit from reminding the world of their more 
than nuisance capacity. More to the point, it fit in with 
a more aggressive Iranian posture that is seeking to 
assert itself regionally.59  
 
 
remains of three Israeli soldiers who had been abducted in 
2000 were exchanged for hundreds of Arab prisoners (see 
below for more on this and other prisoner swaps involving 
Israel and Hizbollah).  
57 Saad-Ghorayeb, op. cit. 
58 Hassan Nasrallah interview, Al-Jazeera television, 21 July 2006.  
59 Hizbollah officials claim otherwise, arguing that Iran had 
nothing to do with it and, indeed, stood to lose. According to 
Hussein el Hajj Hassan, a Hizbollah parliamentarian, Iran 
provides money, but not political direction. “ Iran has no 
interest in pushing Hizbollah toward a confrontation that could 
weaken it at a time when Tehran needs to preserve all its 
cards ”. Crisis Group interview, Beirut, 21 July 2006. In a 
remarkable interview with al-Jazeera, Hassan Nasrallah went 
further, arguing the action weakened Iran’s posture in the 
nuclear negotiations: “No Syrian or Iranian person had had 
C. WHAT IS HIZBOLLAH’S STRATEGY? 
Hizbollah expected the confrontation to follow implicit 
rules of the game, consistent with past practice: a sharp 
Israeli response, bombing of the south, followed by 
protracted third party negotiations over a prisoner 
exchange. That is not how it has unfolded.  
The scope and intensity of the Israeli reaction plainly 
surprised Hizbollah officials60. An intense reprisal was 
anticipated (two hours after the operation, Hizbollah 
took some steps to protect its financial assets), but 
nothing more: warnings to militants to flee their homes 
were issued only following the first bombing raids in 
south Beirut on 14 July.61 Besides imposing a virtual 
blockade, Israel immediately hit three runways at Hariri 
International Airport, Hizbollah offices in southern 
Beirut, two Lebanese army airfields, and the main 
highway between Beirut and Damascus. Later attacks 
targeted the fuel tankers at the airport and the main 
road between the airport and Beirut. Civilian casualties 
rapidly mounted, as of 24 July reaching over 350 dead, 
1,200 injured and more than 500,000 displaced.62  
 
 
any prior information….I had not consulted anyone of them. 
Regarding the Iranian issue, if a war takes place in Lebanon, a 
war will come to an end in one, two, or three months. How 
long would a war take? A war will eventually come to an end. 
What will this change in the Iranian nuclear file? On the 
contrary, I tell you that if there is a relationship with the 
Iranian nuclear file, the current war on Lebanon is not in the 
interest of the Iranian nuclear file. The Americans and Israelis 
have always taken into account that if a confrontation takes 
place with Iran, Hizbollah might interfere in Iran’s interest. If 
Hizbollah is hit now, what does this mean? This means that 
Iran is weakened in its nuclear file, not strengthened”. Hassan 
Nasrallah interview, Al-Jazeera television, 21 July 2006. A 
senior Iranian official agreed: “It is idiotic to think that Iran 
was behind these attacks in order to divert attention from the 
nuclear case. It is only going to increase attention to our 
nuclear case. And the ensuing chaos is Lebanon is detrimental 
in our interests”. Crisis Group telephone interview, 21 July 
2006. Likewise on Syria, Nasrallah noted: “Does anybody 
believe that a confrontation of this kind will cancel the 
international tribunal decision [concerning Rafiq al-Hariri’s 
murder] if there is an international will to establish an 
international tribunal?” He concluded: “Are we that crazy that 
I and my brothers want to sacrifice our souls, our families, our 
honourable masses and our dear ones in order to have Syria 
return to Lebanon, or to postpone the international tribunal, or 
for the sake of the Iranian nuclear file!...This is an insult”. Al-
Jazeera interview.  
60 Crisis Group interviews, Hizbollah leaders and 
intellectuals, Beirut, July 2006.  
61 Crisis Group interview, Lebanese sheikh close to 
Hizbollah, Beirut, 22 July 2006. 
62 Crisis Group interviews, Beirut, 24 July 2006.  
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For Hizbollah, the message was stark. Rather than 
another episode in the recurring battle with Israel, this 
was becoming something far more serious. Hizbollah 
shifted mindsets, increasingly slipping into its identity 
as the vanguard of the Arab-Islamic world fighting an 
ideological, anti-imperialist cause. The confrontation 
was not about the Israeli-Hizbollah tug-of-war, but 
the future of the region as a whole. Hizbollah’s quasi-
messianic dimension ought not be underestimated: at 
bottom it still views itself as leading an anti-Israeli 
and anti-imperialist struggle, together with regional 
allies, but not strictly on their behalf. “Resistance” in 
this sense is not so much a practice as a reflection of 
the fundamental identity of a movement born out of, 
and defined by, confrontation with Israel. The escalation 
may not have been invited but in a way it was welcome, 
allowing Hizbollah to “serve as an inspiration, as an 
exemplar of bold action against Israel and, by extension, 
against Arab regimes that have allied themselves with 
the United States and Israel”.63 
Hizbollah militants interviewed by Crisis Group after 
the conflict sharply escalated were unanimous: now 
that the struggle has moved to this phase, we must 
rekindle the spirit of Arab nationalistic resistance that 
frightened Arab governments have betrayed and put 
an end to inter-Islamic divisions, particularly in Iraq, 
for they detract from the spirit of resistance:  
We are not merely facing an Israeli response. It is 
a well-rehearsed plan to alter the regional map. 
For us, the operation aimed strictly at exchanging 
prisoners and definitely closing the prisoners’ file. 
Israel chose to escalate, going far beyond the 
question of prisoners and targeting civilians. Now, 
we are in the midst of a war aimed at breaking the 
steadfastness of the Arab nation (Umma).64  
A Hizbollah member of parliament echoed this view: 
What is at stake in this war is the imposition of an 
Israeli order on this region, meaning the eradication 
of Hizbollah and the forceful implementation of 
1559 in the first instance, followed by the 
eradication of Hamas and the end of any 
 
 
63 Saad-Ghorayeb, op. cit. The depth of Nasrallah’s contempt 
for Arab regimes comes out in his extraordinarily instructive 
al-Jazeera interview. Explaining why Hizbollah does not 
bother criticising them, he said: “To attack someone, you 
need to suppose that he exists….With regard to the Arab 
regimes, we expect them only to sit on the fence….We did 
not expect them to take part in shedding the blood of the 
victim and cover the crimes of the executioner. Yes, this was 
a surprise”.  
64 Crisis Group interview, Nawaf al Moussawi, 17 July 2006. 
Palestinian state….Beyond that, what’s at stake is 
Lebanon’s and Jordan’s independence.65  
Understanding Hizbollah’s perspective is also critical to 
assessing Iran and Syria’s potential role. To the extent 
the present fighting is viewed as a regional conflict, and 
to the extent they provide Hizbollah with money and 
weapons, Tehran’s and Damascus’ interests and desires 
must be taken into account. But to the extent Hizbollah 
sees the end-goal of the other side as its elimination, its 
two allies’ influence by definition is reduced. The 
Islamist movement will not agree to conditions such as 
disarming and full enforcement of 1559, because it 
would consider this in the current context as suicidal.  
Not that Hizbollah necessarily consider this as the ultimate 
battle, and herein lies another apparent contradiction. 
Although it sees an attempt by Israel to broaden the 
stakes of the war, and Nasrallah in particular has painted 
this as an existential struggle, the fundamental objective 
has not truly changed: it is to hold firm and compel 
Israel to revert to the conflict’s original size and stakes 
by hitting hard but within certain bounds, carefully 
calibrating its actions in order to always keep the 
diplomatic option open. The objective is less to triumph 
than to succeed, through a ceasefire that reverts to the 
status quo ante or, at a minimum, reflects far less than 
Israel’s initial objectives. In Hussein el Hajj Hassan’s 
words, the goal is to “maintain our initial stance, in other 
words an unconditional ceasefire and indirect negotiations 
and exchange on the matter of the prisoners”.66 Or, as 
Nasrallah put it: “The victory we are talking about is 
when the resistance survives. When its will is not 
broken, then this is victory....When we are not defeated 
militarily, then this is victory...in addition to this, when 
the Israelis begin to make concessions”.67 
To achieve its objectives, Hizbollah is counting on 
several factors: its staying power and difficulties facing 
any Israeli attempt to destroy its military potential; 
domestic support in a conflict increasingly viewed as 
opposing Israel and Lebanon rather than Israel and 
Hizbollah; the weakening of any internal pressure on 
Hizbollah to give in the more the war goes on and 
casualties mount; and, in contrast, growing fissures 
within Israeli society as the costs of battle increase.68  
It is a risky strategy. What Hizbollah sees as proportional 
responses to Israeli actions, Israel does not. And while 
Hizbollah claims to have been careful not to cross the 
point of no return – by attacking a chemical plant or 
 
 
65 Crisis Group interview, Hussein al-Hajj, Beirut, 21 July 2006. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Hassan Nasrallah interview, Al-Jazeera television, 21 July 2006.  
68 Crisis Group interviews, Beirut, July 2006. 
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some other vital infrastructure – it already has proved 
with the first salvo a considerable ability to miscalculate. 
By launching rockets on Haifa, Nazareth and 
elsewhere, it may already have made that mistake. 
D. HOW IS HIZBOLLAH FARING? 
Getting a reliable assessment of the conflict is no easy 
task. Claims by both sides are near impossible to verify. 
Still, certain indicators from within Lebanon are telling; 
more than that, Hizbollah’s perception of the conflict, 
misguided as it might be, is a critical indicator of how 
long it is prepared to hold out and, at a time when 
diplomatic solutions are being explored, what outcomes 
it is liable to accept. 
The most striking impression from discussions with 
Hizbollah militants is one of cold, strong optimism 
concerning the conflict’s evolution, arguably part 
propaganda, part self-delusion, yet relevant nonetheless. 
They claim that neither side has dealt the other a 
decisive blow. Hizbollah has fired roughly 150 to 200 
missiles a day,69 reaching a total of approximately 2,200 
as of 23 July.70 If estimates of its arsenal are correct 
(somewhere between 10,000 and 14,000 missiles) and if 
Israel is able to prevent its resupply, it will be able to 
continue at this rate for at least several more weeks. 
Although some Israeli sources claim that up to 50 per 
cent of the arsenal has been destroyed, there has been 
scant visual evidence of this. Hizbollah officials claim to 
have lost very few militants or rocket launchers and to 
have fared well in land combat.71 They also allege that 
“all of the assessments that have been made 
underestimate our military capacity, both quantitatively 
and qualitatively”,72 pointing to the highly sophisticated 
attack on an Israeli naval vessel and their strikes on 
Haifa and alluding to their possession of other, 
unsuspected weaponry.  
They also take solace from Israel’s target selection, 
which they see as indicating it is reaching the limits of 
what it can do by air. Lacking genuine military targets, 
for the most part, they say, Israel has taken out 
Hizbollah’s civilian infrastructure. It has destroyed 
most of the party’s public infrastructure (the al-Hoda 
cooperative in the Bekaa, the party’s study centre in 
 
 
69 The estimate – from Qasim Qasir, a journalist and expert on 
Hizbollah – is corroborated by Israeli figures. Crisis Group 
interview, Beirut, 20 July 2006; Ronny Sofer, “Peretz: 2,200 
rockets fired at Israel so far”, Ynet, 23 July 2006. 
70 According to al-Jazeera, 23 July 2006. 
71 Crisis Group interview, journalist with close ties to 
Hizbollah, Beirut, 17 July 2006. 
72 Ibid. 
Beirut, schools, social service centres, the headquarters 
of the Jihad al Bina association, medical centres and 
the like),73 but has not affected its ability to launch 
missiles. Even with regard to non-military assets, the 
outcome is mixed. “They have repeatedly bombed the 
airport, launched 22 aerial raids on Beirut’s southern 
suburb. Yet, despite all that, they haven’t even been 
able to interrupt our television station, al Manar”.74  
By the same token, they vaunt the degree to which 
while this may not have been a war they anticipated, 
it was a war for which they were prepared. For the 
past six years, they claim, they were readying for this 
day, establishing an independent infrastructure, building 
autonomous and protected communications as well as 
command and control systems, and training their 
militants. The speed with which Nasrallah, despite 
obvious threats to his life, has been able to respond to 
developing events is another sign.  
Key to Hizbollah’s position has been the evolution of 
Lebanon’s public opinion. At the outset of the war, large 
numbers of Lebanese, including Shiites, expressed anger, 
accusing Hizbollah of dragging the country into an 
unnecessary, unjustified and costly war. Clearly, Israel 
was counting on turning the civilian population against 
the movement. Early on, it dropped leaflets in the south 
using doctored renditions of the Islamists’ slogan to 
erode popular support. What was “the resistance protects 
the Nation, the Nation protects the Resistance” became 
“the resistance protects the Nation; the Nation is the 
victim of the resistance”. In the Christian neighbourhood 
of Ashrafieh, in Beirut, another Israeli leaflet depicted 
Nasrallah as the pawn of foreign agents – Ahmadinejad, 
Khaled Mishal and Syria’s Bashar al Asad – playing 
with Lebanon’s future. More broadly, Israel aimed to turn 
the civilian population against Hizbollah by punishing it. 
The strategy has largely backfired. While anger at 
Hizbollah endures, particularly among non-Shiites, it 
has been superseded or at least neutralised among 
many by outrage at Israel’s military operations which 
are seen as attempts to destroy the country, not the 
movement.  
Israel’s disproportionate response is to blame.75 This 
was not inevitable: Israel could have played on 
 
 
73 Crisis Group interview, Ali Fayyad, Beirut, 17 July 2006. 
74 Crisis Group interview, Hussein al-Hajj, Beirut, 21 July 2006. 
75 The Swiss government, in particular, as the state depositary of 
the Geneva Conventions, has repeatedly condemned in official 
statements the disproportionate use of force by Israel both in 
Gaza and in Lebanon. See “Lebanon: Switzerland condemns 
Israel’s disproportionate reaction”, Swiss Federal Department of 
Foreign Affairs, 13 July 2006; “Micheline Calmy-Rey critique 
sévèrement Israël”, SwissInfo, 20 July 2006. 
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Lebanon’s sectarian divisions and Hizbollah’s relatively 
precarious position to rally the middle class and business 
community, including among Shiites, against the 
movement. But that would have required far more 
restraint, caution, and wisdom in targeting, all of which 
has been lacking. This is not to say that Israel’s 
operations were indiscriminate: among targets not hit 
have been most non-Shiite residential neighbourhoods, 
major telecommunication networks, and energy and 
water-related infrastructure (some were attacked, but 
clearly not with the goal of halting gas and electricity 
supply).  
But it is the list of what was targeted that stands out: 
economic infrastructure bearing little or no relation to 
Hizbollah; the airport (far more than necessary to meet 
any reasonable military goal); Beirut’s entire southern 
suburb (far beyond Hizbollah’s infrastructure); the ports 
of Beirut and Jounieh (in Christian territory); industrial 
plants;76 bridges leading to the south (presumably in 
order to cut it off, interfere with Hizbollah’s resupply, 
prevent militants from moving the Israeli captives 
around and alienate the local population, but all this at 
enormous humanitarian cost); the army, including check 
points in Christian areas (highly questionable since the 
army has stayed out of the conflict, avoided using its 
anti-aircraft capacity despite the onslaught, focused on 
maintaining domestic law and order and, above all, 
remains the only instrument capable of extending the 
state’s authority over the country as a whole).  
This should not be misinterpreted. Among large segments 
of the population, primarily Sunnis and Christians, the 
Islamist movement continues to be blamed for dragging 
the country into an unnecessary and costly war. The 
animosity is even more pronounced at the official level. 
Privately, senior officials can be scathing.77 According 
to several consistent reports, Nasrallah had assured the 
government (as well as, through intermediaries, the UN) 
only days prior to the attack that he would guarantee a 
“quiet summer” to take advantage of a promising tourism 
season; the surprise operation destroyed any remaining 
trust, with effects likely to last for a long time to come.78 
Going further, some officials confide that, at this point, 
only Israeli military action can curb a movement that, they 
say, has shown itself “beholden to a foreign actor”,79 and 
are in no hurry for a ceasefire that would leave 
Hizbollah politically and militarily intact. The prospect 
 
 
76 Among these, reportedly: Liban lait, a milk factory, in the 
Bekaa Valley, a plastic factory in Tyre, a tissue and paper 
factory in Sidon, a paper mill and medical supply company 
in Beirut’s southern suburb. See Daily Star, 19 July 2006. 
77 Crisis Group interviews, Beirut, July 2006. 
78 Crisis Group interviews, Beirut, July 2006. 
79 Crisis Group interview, Beirut, 24 July 2006. 
of a political crisis, leading to Hizbollah’s departure 
from the government, is becoming increasingly likely. 
But that is only part of the story. The intensity of Israel’s 
reaction has coalesced opinion against it and, if not in 
Hizbollah’s favour, at least not in public opposition to 
it. Hizbollah’s evident military strength also had a quieting 
effect, as political actors fear future retribution. Those 
leaders who, at first, had openly criticised the Islamists’ 
reckless act80 thus have been largely silenced. In a 
context that is becoming purely military, military strength 
speaks loudest – and on this front at least, Hizbollah has 
no domestic match.  
Among Shiites, support for Hizbollah is running strong. 
In Beirut’s southern suburbs, which have borne the 
brunt of Israeli attacks and have become a virtual war 
zone of destruction, there is little hint of resentment at 
the Islamists even among non-Hizbollah members. 
Individuals pin their hopes on Nasrallah, some seeing 
in him “the Nasser of the new millennium”,81 others a 
reincarnation of Che Guevara82. Traditional Hizbollah 
sympathisers tend to present the movement’s initial 
attack as retaliatory rather then provocative, a response to 
the open wounds of the Israeli-Lebanese dispute: the status 
of the Shebaa farms, Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails 
and Israel’s regular violation of Lebanese sovereignty83. 
Among non-Shiites, the common thread is a mixture 
of both hatred toward Israel that has been exacerbated 
by the war and solidarity with civilian victims. Many 
still blame Hizbollah, but with each passing day the 
original trigger for the conflagration recedes further in 
their minds; what remains vivid are its latest effects. 
One noteworthy development is among militant Sunni 
Islamists, particularly in their stronghold of Tripoli. In 
the war’s initial days, most openly expressed hostility 
toward Hizbollah, held responsible for recklessly 
endangering the country. Now, although underlying 
antagonism toward Shiites has not evaporated, and evident 
signs of anger at Nasrallah’s movement remain, there 
are other tell-tale signs. There are Sunni vendors selling 
tapes of Hizbollah songs and Nasrallah speeches. “We 
do not share Hizbollah’s ideas. But we share their pain”.84  
 
 
80 In his first reaction, Prime Minister Siniora clearly sought 
to distance the government from the raid. He noted that the 
government was “not aware of and does not take 
responsibility for, nor endorses what happened on the 
international border”, The New York Times, 13 July 2006. 
81 Crisis Group interview, 19 July 2006. 
82 Crisis Group interview, 19 July 2006. 
83 Crisis Group interview, Beirut, 19 July 2006. 
84 Crisis Group interviews, Tripoli, 19 July 2006 
84 Crisis Group telephone interviews, Tripoli 19 July 2006 
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Among organised Sunni movements, including those 
independent of Syria, “only the salafists are not 
expressing solidarity with Hizbollah at this point. All 
other Sunni parties, such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Hizb 
al-Tawhid, are lauding the resistance”.85 Indeed, even 
salafis are not united, torn between hatred of Shiites 
and of Israel. There have been some signs of tension 
between salafi preachers and their constituency; Crisis 
Group witnessed several young faithfuls walk out of a 
sermon deemed excessively critical of Hizbollah.86  
For young Sunnis in particular, the driving sentiment 
is anti-American and anti-Israeli. In Tripoli, the most 
popular Nasrallah sermons are those taking aim at John 
Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, or mocking 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Hizbollah has 
been playing on this:  
Now, two options are face to face: surrender to 
Israel and to the United States, or resistance. 
In the Muslim world, the spirit of resistance 
(mouqawama) was declining. Divisions among 
Muslims (fitna) must be understood in this 
light: the weakening of the spirit of resistance 
and the strengthening of communitarian identities 
were occurring at the expense of the muslim 
community, its civilizational identity, the Umma.87  
Echoing such sentiment, and drawing on the juxtaposition 
with the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, Fathi Yakan, the founder 
of the Lebanese Muslim Brothers (Jamaa Islamiyaa) 
stated: 
What is happening is the confrontation between 
two camps, one that is aligned with the West, the 
other that is based on its Arab-Muslim identity. 
With its operation, Hizbollah showed its solidarity 
with the Palestinians, seeking to diminish pressure 
on Palestine and on Hamas. That is why its action 
was broadly endorsed within Sunni circles.88 
Among Christians one finds greater and more vocal 
opposition toward Hizbollah. There greatest fear is that 
the Islamist movement emerges victorious, stronger and 
more menacing than before. Reflecting previous political 
alignments, Maronites are divided between the Lebanese 
Forces led by Samir Geagea, which sees in Hizbollah a 
mortal enemy and in the current confrontation perhaps 
the best chance to eliminate its military potential, and 
 
 
85 Crisis Group interview, member of High Council of Sunni 
Islamic Affairs, Tripoli, 19 July 2006; also Crisis Group 
interviews, Salafi preachers, Tripoli, 19 July 2006. 
86 Crisis Group interviews, Tripoli, 14 July 2006. 
87 Crisis Group interview, Nawaf al-Moussawi, Hizbollah 
official in charge of external relations, 18 July 2006. 
88 Crisis Group interview, Fathi Yakan, Tripoli, 15 July 2006. 
its civil-war rival, Michel Aoun. Describing the former’s 
attitude, a Christian explained: “There are some people I 
know who don’t care about what is going on in the south, 
as it doesn’t affect them directly, and some have gone 
as far as to say that Israel can do what it wants to those 
people as they have brought nothing but disaster to the 
country”.89 In contrast, Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement 
has stuck to its seemingly unnatural alliance with 
Nasrallah, describing the conflict as a war against 
Lebanon as a whole. Marie Dibs, a member of the 
Communist Party, herself a Christian and strongly 
anti-Syrian, is an example of how circumstances can 
affect individual positions. Hizbollah’s abduction of 
the Israeli soldier, she said, “was within the right of 
an actor operating in an occupied country and because 
the Lebanese prisoners are combatants. The resistance 
is a part of our people, it is not separate from it. Unlike 
the Baath party, Hizbollah is a national, Lebanese party. 
If Israel enters our country, then as communists we will 
join the resistance”.90  
Most of these newfound solidarities are purely 
circumstantial, and no doubt temporary; once the dust 
settles, unease and antagonism almost certainly will 
resurface, in some ways more intensely than before. For 
now, however, they are kept under wraps. That is an 
important point: it means that for the time being 
Hizbollah is under little pressure to moderate its position 
and helps explain its confidence and feeling that time is 
on its side.  
Hizbollah’s contrasting readings of Lebanese and Israeli 
societies, while questionable, is highly instructive. In 
what may strike many observers as paradoxical, it sees 
its home front as more solid than Israel’s. Unlike Israel, 
which over time will face a restless populace, organised 
opposition and inquisitive press, Hizbollah believes it has 
no effective counterweight in Lebanon. The feeble central 
government is unable to act and looks increasingly 
impotent; other socio-political forces will either stay on 
the fence or, compelled by Israel’s actions to take sides, 
rally to Hizbollah. An Israeli ground offensive would, 
according to this interpretation, suit the Islamists, dragging 
their enemy onto hostile territory, bolstering Lebanese 
unity and intensifying doubt within Israel over the war’s 
wisdom. In contrast, the more time goes on, the less the 
Lebanese will recall how the confrontation began, and the 
more they will have in mind the latest Israeli bombing 
raid. A Hizbollah sympathiser concludes:  
Israel will have to retreat for three reasons: its 
attempts to divide Lebanon have failed; its strikes 
are hitting civilian infrastructure not Hizbollah’s 
 
 
89 Crisis Group interview, Jounieh, 20 July 2006. 
90 Crisis Group interview, Marie Dibs, Beirut 22 July 2006. 
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military structure; and Hizbollah has shown it can 
hit targets well within Israel. The more time passes, 
the more Israel will face a quagmire.91 
E. TOWARD DOMESTIC STRIFE? 
Well-founded or not, the movement’s self-confidence 
helps explain the seeming inalterability of its demands: a 
ceasefire followed by a prisoner exchange. Hizbollah 
officials and militants told Crisis Group they could not 
accept anything else, notably the interposition of an 
international force, moving Hizbollah positions north, 
let alone implementation of Resolution 1559.92 A 
strengthened UN presence, for instance, is considered 
unacceptable: “It would be in order to protect Israel, not 
Lebanon. To protect Lebanon, we need Hizbollah”.93  
Distrust of the U.S. is an important element. As a 
Hizbollah leader put it, “Israel is not the main issue. The 
main issue is the U.S. How do you expect us to accept 
international guarantees [concerning the interposition 
force] under the U.S.’s umbrella? We don’t believe in 
anything that has to do with the U.S. anymore”.94 Tariq 
Mitry, the Christian minister of culture, added: “The 
UN’s current force in South Lebanon is not even 
capable of protecting fleeing civilians. A group of about 
twenty people was killed after vainly requesting help 
from UN soldiers”!95 Nasrallah made this as plain as 
could be in his al-Jazeera interview: “Israel did not get a 
green light from the United States. Instead, Israel was 
given a decision by the United States to go and finish 
this issue in Lebanon”. 
Just as Hizbollah’s reckless attacks further convinced 
Israel and large segments of the international community 
of the urgent need to remove the movement’s arms, 
Israel’s response convinced Hizbollah and its supporters 
of the continued need to preserve them. Nor do 
Hizbollah leaders believe the central government will be 
in a position to act against them. Even if the war has 
weakened the movement in absolute terms, it remains at 
least as strong relative to other domestic actors. If the 
army were to try to curb Hizbollah, it would have to 
contend with its numerous Shiite conscripts who are not 
about to act against the movement.96  
 
 
91 Crisis Group interview, Ali al-Fayadh, director of a 
Hizbollah-affiliated research centre, Beirut, 18 July 2006. 
92 Crisis Group interviews, Beirut, July 2006. 
93 Crisis Group interview, Hizbollah sympathiser, Beirut, 16 
July 2006. 
94 Crisis Group interview, Hussein al Hajj Hassan, Beirut, 21 
July 2006. 
95 Le Temps, 18 July 2006. 
96 Crisis Group interviews, Beirut, July 2006. 
This could spell trouble. Motivated in part by its own 
distrust of Hizbollah and desire to disarm it, in part by 
foreign pressure, the Lebanese government may well 
endorse demands the movement deeply distrusts: the 
dispatch of an international force, the consolidation of 
Hizbollah’s weapons as a first step toward disarmament, 
implementation of all international resolutions. Should 
that occur, Hizbollah ministers – and other Shiite 
ministers – may leave the government, breaking the 
fragile truce that has prevailed between them until 
now. If the so-called 14 March coalition (named after 
the massive demonstrations that called for Syria’s 
withdrawal in the wake of Hariri’s assassination) 
were to revive and seek to carry out this agenda, a 
collision course might become inevitable with Hizbollah, 
its pro-Syrian allies, and the Shiite constituency. The 
country’s stability could be endangered. 
Already, there are worrying signs of tension. One 
example: In the village of Qalamoun, refugees from 
the south who attempted to place a picture of Nasrallah 
over one of Saad al-Hariri were expelled from the 
school where they were lodging. Elsewhere, Shiite 
refugees are said to be tearing down pictures of 
Hariri.97 More broadly, Shiite resentment at what is 
perceived as Sunni and Christian indifference to their 
plight is growing, just as anger at Shiites for what is 
seen as the country’s needless destruction remains. 
The enormous hardships caused by population 
displacement only add to the volatile mix. Patience is 
wearing thin. As the country reaches boiling point, it 
might not take much for the situation to explode. 
 
 
97 Crisis Group interviews, July 2006. 
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IV. THE VIEW FROM ISRAEL  
A. THE TIPPING POINT 
In previous case, Israel had agreed to prisoner exchanges 
with Palestinian groups and Hizbollah, including in a 
prominent instance – after the 2000 unilateral Israeli 
withdrawal from South Lebanon; based on precedent, 
Hizbollah apparently anticipated – controlled exchange 
of fire followed by an exchange of prisoners mediated 
through third parties. This time proved different, 
apparently much to Hizbollah’s surprise. 
Israel’s broad and intensive response is explained by 
several factors. Most importantly, as a result of a series 
of events going back to 2000, its leaders have grown 
increasingly concerned about the perceived erosion of 
their military deterrence. The list begins with the 
disengagement from Lebanon, which Hizbollah and 
Palestinian groups read and portrayed as the triumph of 
armed resistance; continued with Hizbollah attacks that, 
some felt, were met with insufficient retaliation; and 
climaxed with the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. The 
growing audacity of Palestinian attacks was attributed, 
in part, to a psychological evolution. As a result, and 
although from a strategic perspective Israel’s position 
arguably was as secure as ever – no credible Arab 
conventional threat, Saddam Hussein gone, a weakened 
Palestinian national movement and unprecedented 
international support – the sense of strength paradoxically 
mixed with an abiding sense of vulnerability.  
Longer-term regional developments also were of 
concern. The growth of an increasingly popular brand 
of Islamism and Iran’s reassertive, belligerent attitude 
and nuclear program were viewed by many as trends 
that had to be dealt with sooner rather than later. 
Finally, the domestic situation played a part: the new 
government had no generals in its upper ranks, and 
both Prime Minister Olmert and Defence Minister 
Peretz were new at their jobs.  
The near-simultaneity of the Palestinian and Lebanese 
abductions – which led to charges of complacency and 
severe intelligence and operational failures98 – proved to 
be the tipping point. If the Hamas and Hizbollah operations 
were not directly linked, Israel’s response certainly was. 
 
 
98A report by former National Security Council Adviser 
Giora Eiland into the abduction in Gaza highlighted military 
errors. Major General Uri Sagi, former head of the IDF 
intelligence corps, also spoke of “serious concerns about 
what we did and didn’t know”, Haaretz, 18 July 2006. “For 
six years, the army had been complacent”, Crisis Group 
interview, foreign ministry official, Jerusalem, July 2006. 
While there had been signs of progress on a possible 
indirect deal between Israel and Hamas, the Hizbollah 
operation put this on indefinite hold. With hostilities 
rapidly escalating on the northern border, besides, 
developments in Gaza took a relative back seat (although 
Israeli attacks continued); to the extent they were 
addressed, they increasingly were seen in tandem with 
those in Lebanon. In Israel, this strengthened the view of 
officials for whom dealing both organisations a crushing 
blow had become paramount.99  
Senior officials began to speak in far broader terms, 
linking the issues and evoking the need to provoke 
deeper, longer-term changes in the region, including by 
crippling the two Islamist movements and their foreign 
sponsors. As Foreign Minister Livni put it, “Israel is 
fighting to protect its citizens; Israel is fighting to eliminate 
the threat posed by the axis of terror and hate of the 
Hizbollah and Hamas, Syria and Iran”.100 Or, in the words 
of one of Amir Peretz’s political allies: “We are fighting 
in two sectors of confrontation sponsored by Iran”.101 A 
Lebanese analyst remarked: “I feel as if Israel reacted to 
6/12 in the same way that the U.S. reacted to 9/11”.102 
Of the two attacks, Hizbollah’s was seen by far as the 
more serious and therefore more deserving of a 
punishing response: there appeared to be no conceivable 
pretext (unlike the Palestinian case, the international 
community recognised the end of Israel’s presence in 
Lebanon); a more acute regional (i.e., Iranian) dimension; 
and, perhaps most critical, a potentially far more lethal 
adversary. Hizbollah’s possession of upwards of 10,000 
rockets within range of Israeli cities had long been a 
cause for deep concern; only days prior to the attack, 
Israeli officials had spoken to Crisis Group about the 
“unsustainability” of the status quo:  
We might invade in five years or in ten. But we 
will if 13,000 rockets covering a third of my country 
remain under the control of a man in a turban with 
his finger on the button. One day Nasrallah will 
push the button. We can never allow it.103 
 
 
99 Crisis Group interviews, Tel Aviv, July 2006. 
100 Press conference, with Javier Solana, 19 June 2006.  
101 Crisis Group interview, Ephraim Sneh, member of the 
Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defence committee and 
former commander of the security zone in South Lebanon, 
Jerusalem, July 2006.  
102 Crisis Group interview, Lebanese analyst, 23 July 2006. 
103 Crisis Group interview, Sneh, Jerusalem, June 2006. 
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B. ISRAEL’S GOALS 
Hizbollah’s attack thus provided Israel with both reason 
and opportunity to degrade a potentially lethal military 
arsenal. The location of the Lebanese movement’s attack 
made this all the more compelling: unlike virtually all 
other operations that followed the 2000 withdrawal, this 
one did not focus on the contested Shebaa farms. 104 
Again, prior to the recent attack, an Israeli official made 
clear to Crisis Group that a sharp distinction would be 
drawn if Hizbollah targeted any other area of the country 
and laid out a remarkably prescient analysis of how his 
country would react:  
For a long time I said to my authorities up to the 
prime minister that as long as Hizbollah operates 
in Shebaa…once in a while, two three times a 
year, usually against military targets, usually with 
anti-tank missiles, usually with no casualties – I 
would not escalate the situation. It does not mean 
I accept it. The UN said clearly that Shebaa is not 
Lebanese territory, and there is no reason for 
these attacks. The reason I said no escalation was 
if at the end of the day we do whatever we do and 
then return to the same balance we have now, 
then what is the point of going into Lebanon, 
killing however many people, pulling back but 
with the same rules and same equation in place.  
But if they cross the threshold and attack beyond 
Shebaa, if they attack civilians not military 
targets, or if they start with katyushas and not 
anti-tank missiles – then we will have to respond. 
When we do that, we will have to be probably 
very devastating and destroy half of Lebanon. 
Why? Not because I want to destroy Lebanon but 
because I would like the international community 
to come and say stop it and then I would say ok, 
stand by the Lebanese government and tell them: 
 
 
104 Among these earlier operations, in October 2000 three 
Israeli soldiers were captured by Hizbollah in a commando 
raid while patrolling the Shebaa farms area; a November 2000 
attack on an Israeli patrol in the Shebaa farms area left one 
Israeli soldier dead; Hizbollah killed an Israeli soldier with 
rocket fire in the Shebaa Farms area in February 2001; further 
attacks on the area occurred in April and June 2001, May 
2004, and June 2005. Israel responded to these with artillery 
fire, air strikes, and the like, but nothing on the scale of current 
operations. An Israeli businessman, Elhanan Tannenbaum and 
the remains of three soldiers were exchanged for 435 Arab 
prisoners, including 30 Lebanese and 400 Palestinian 
prisoners, in 2004. Many Israelis feel that that exchange sent 
precisely the wrong message to Hizbollah about the possibility 
of prisoner swaps.  
extend your sovereignty to the south, deploy the 
Lebanese forces there and get rid of Hizbollah.105 
Indeed, immediately after the Hizbollah attack, Israel 
embarked on a major, far-reaching campaign. Olmert 
and Peretz underwent what one Israeli commentator 
dubbed “a leadership graduation”.106 Whereas the 
operation in Gaza had caused some internal dissent, the 
Hizbollah attack led to a swift, national closing of 
ranks; political opponents suspended their criticism of 
the fragile coalition,107 and declining ratings in public 
opinion polls were reversed. 
As the fighting and timeframe have grown, so have the 
goals. For Israel, a return to the status quo ante is 
unacceptable, since it is precisely that precarious balance 
that led to the current situation; for that reason, a rapid 
ceasefire without a significant change in Hizbollah’s 
status is deemed unacceptable. As Israeli officials see 
it, any pressure on Hizbollah to disarm and on the 
international community to take matters into its own 
hands will dissolve the minute the shooting stops. 
“Whatever we don’t achieve vis-à-vis Hizbollah during 
the military phase, we have to assume we will not 
achieve during the diplomatic one. It is as simple as 
that”.108 The conditions Israel put forward for acceptance 
of a ceasefire (release of captured soldiers; an end to 
rocket attacks; deployment of the Lebanese Army along 
the border; some form of Hizbollah disarmament through 
implementation of Resolution 1559) are precisely those 
it knows Hizbollah cannot accept without a major loss 
of face; they are designed not to achieve a cessation of 
hostilities, but to delay it.  
 
 
105 Crisis Group interview, General Eival Giladi, before his 
appointment as the prime minister’s director of the Strategic 
Coordination for the Gaza withdrawal, Tel Aviv, 22 March 2005.  
106 “We have a new set of players – Olmert, Peretz, Livni and 
Haniya – who all suffer from a lack of experience and lack a 
security halo. Regrettably, in this region, leaders have to go to 
war college, not peace college. The hope is they can pass 
through this process as quickly and as bloodlessly as 
possible”, Crisis Group interview, Motti Crystal, former legal 
adviser on Palestinian negotiations, Jerusalem, July 2006. He 
compared Olmert’s military rite of passage in the Summer 
Rain campaign with that of the 1996 Grapes of Wrath 
campaign waged by incoming Prime Minister Shimon Peres.  
107 Crisis Group interviews, Binyamin Netanyahu, former 
Israeli prime minister and opposition Likud leader, Silvan 
Shalom, former Israeli foreign minister, Jerusalem, July 
2006. Some politicians on the left and centre did question 
government policy, a rare breaking of ranks during war time. 
Crisis Group interview, Meretz member, Jerusalem, July 
2006. See Mazal Mualem, “Labor MKs: The time has come 
to question Lebanon incursion”, Haaretz, 23 July 2006. 
108 Crisis Group interview, Israeli official, July 2006. 
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In short, Israel wants to create conditions whereby the 
threat posed by Hizbollah will be seriously reduced, if 
not altogether eliminated. To that end, it is relying on 
several tools: 
 Military: this is the priority. The emphasis is on 
air operations, far less risky than ground operations, 
though these too have been mounted to search for 
rocket caches. The goal is to degrade Hizbollah’s 
military capacity, eliminate as much as possible 
of its leadership109 and force it to move further 
north. Despite serious misgivings about the past 
Israeli military presence in Lebanon, some 
officials are contemplating creating a buffer zone 
in the south to push Hizbollah beyond the Litani 
River. 110 As to the more immediate goal – crippling 
Hizbollah’s arsenal – officials believe they have 
the support of all relevant Western powers to 
continue “until the job is done”.111  
How successful the military campaign has been, 
or can be with more time, is uncertain. Officials 
claim considerable achievements 112 but Hizbollah’s 
staying power appears to have caught them by 
surprise. By the eighth day, with missiles still 
raining down by the score on northern Israel, 
Israeli military analysts told Crisis Group the air 
force had exhausted its first target list. Questioning 
the ability of airpower to achieve the objectives,113 
Israel has deployed paratroopers and special forces 
into Lebanon to identify fresh targets and degrade 
Hizbollah’s command-and-control structure, in what 
the military calls “limited infantry incursions”.114 
Thousands of reserves have been drafted to relieve 
standing forces mobilised to the northern border.115 
 
 
109 Southern Beirut, Hizbollah’s stronghold, was heavily 
bombarded, and repeated raids were made on the presumed 
bunker of Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. 
110 “If the Lebanese Army can’t do it, we will have to do it 
ourselves. We will not let the mercenaries of Ahmadi-Nejad 
back.” Crisis Group interview, Sneh, Jerusalem, July 2006.  
111 Crisis Group interview, Amos Gilad, director of the defence 
ministry’s political-security division, Jerusalem, July 2006.  
112 “So far we destroyed some 50 per cent of Hizbollah’s 
capabilities”, Shaul Mofaz, former Israeli defence minister and 
current transport minister, quoted in Ynet, 20 July 2006.  
113 “The air force touted for years that it can take care of any 
missile attack, and it’s failed completely – nothing’s been shot 
down”, Crisis Group interview, Steven Rodan, military 
correspondent, Jerusalem, July 2006.  
114 Crisis Group interview, former military commander, 
Jerusalem, July 2006. Israeli ground forces did, however, 
capture Ghajar inside Lebanese territory. Yaakov Katz, “IDF 
forces conquer area inside Lebanese territory”, The Jerusalem 
Post, 17 July 2006.  
115 See www.ynetnews.com/Ext/Comp/CdaNewsFlash/ 
0,2297,L-3277523_3089,00.html. According to Haaretz, 
But ground operations are precisely what Hizbollah 
leaders claim they want – dragging Israel into a 
combat style that suits the guerrilla force’s strengths.  
 International: the goal is to create enough pressure 
for implementation of 1559, with tools that could 
potentially include an international force to monitor 
borders (to ensure no arms are sent to Hizbollah) 
and police the south. But there is caution: from 
Israel’s perspective, an international presence is 
seen at best as insufficient, at worse as counter-
productive. The history of such forces in Lebanon – 
from UNIFIL in 1978 to the multinational force 
in 1982 – teaches one of two things: either it is 
viewed by Hizbollah as hostile, becomes its target, 
and rapidly fades away; or, as with the UN force, it 
is toothless, able to monitor and report, but nothing 
more. Its presence may inhibit Israel’s ability to act 
without constraining Hizbollah’s ability to threaten.  
Political leaders expressed concern any foreign 
force would leave at the first sign of confrontation. 
In the words of former Prime Minister Netanyahu, 
“the objective should be the removal of all missiles 
period. You think Kofi Annan can do that?”116 A 
foreign ministry official explained: “UNIFIL will 
not happen again. If it is not effective, it will not 
stay...it will only serve as a fig-leaf” behind which 
guerrilla groups could continue to attack.117 
Officials reacted more favourably to proposals that 
the UN mandate be expanded from monitoring 
Security Council resolutions to enforcing them, 
particularly 1559.118  
 Domestic: Israel also hopes that the Lebanese 
government will gradually seek to rein in Hizbollah, 
which has dragged the entire country into war, 
begin to disarm it; and deploy the army south. In 
particular, Israeli forces sought to alienate the 
population from Hizbollah by conducting punitive 
raids on targets important to civilians including 
bridges and other infrastructure and causing 
massive population flight. While overall there 
appears to be little faith in the present capacity or 
 
 
Israel mobilised 18,000 soldiers to reinforce its northern front, 
including 4,600 reserves. Haaretz, 23 July 2006.  
116 Crisis Group interview, Netanyahu, Jerusalem, July 2006. 
A Western diplomat also doubted that the political will 
existed to stand up the estimated 15,000 troops he estimated 
would be required to enforce Resolution 1559. Crisis Group 
interview, Tel Aviv, July 2006.  
117 Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, July 2006. UNIFIL is 
currently comprised of troops from China, France, Ghana, 
India, Ireland, Italy, Poland and Ukraine.  
118 Crisis Group interview, foreign ministry official, Jerusalem, 
July 2006. Peretz also was quoted as lending his support. 
Haaretz, 23 July 2006. 
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willingness of the government, it is viewed as 
part of a longer term solution. 
Israel’s goals regarding Hamas have appeared, in 
comparison, more ambiguous and fluctuating. Until 
Hizbollah’s attack, officials mostly did not evoke 
Hamas’s destruction, though steps were taken (see below) 
that raised considerable doubt.119 Since the eruption of 
the Lebanese crisis, two contradictory trends can be 
noted. There has been a temptation to link developments 
and mobilise international and domestic support for a 
two-pronged strategy of ridding the region of what are 
called the extremist, militant Islamist threat and Iran’s 
regional pawns. The elimination of “Iran’s warheads in the 
region”,120 it is said, would reduce Tehran’s deterrent 
capacity in the event of a showdown over the nuclear issue.  
But some analysts believe that decoupling the two 
issues would serve Israel’s interests best. “There will 
not be a package deal that includes the two crises; there 
will be no connection made between the kidnapped 
soldier in the south and those in the north; there will 
not be any link between Nasrallah and the issue of the 
Palestinian prisoners and the Palestinian issue. That will 
not be”.121 Under this view, resolving the Palestinian 
matter through a deal with Hamas would isolate 
Hizbollah, depriving it of the Palestinian card, create 
tensions between the two movements and allow Israel 
to focus on a single front. 
What began as a botched campaign aimed at recovering a 
soldier captured on 25 June 2006122 was quickly subsumed 
into an ongoing campaign to diminish Palestinian missile 
capabilities, which, though with more psychological 
than military impact, had eroded public confidence in 
Israel’s three-month-old government. In addition, officials 
suggested their campaign was intended to “change the 
rules of the game”, reinforce Israel’s option to break 
Hamas control of the PA government and, more vaguely, 
sap Palestinian morale and erode support for Hamas.  
But with the desired endgame undefined, in contrast 
to Lebanon, the military objectives appear blurred. While 
 
 
119 “Peretz decided to clash with them [Hamas]. It’s time for 
moderate majorities to decide. The government of Hamas 
must be out by 2006”, Crisis Group interview, Ephraim Sneh, 
Jerusalem, June 2006. “Israel is showing Hamas that they 
cannot control the PA again….The whole campaign is 
designed for this conclusion”. Ehud Yaari, Israel Newsmakers 
Forum conference attended by Crisis Group, 12 July 2006.  
120 Crisis Group interview, Amos Gilad, director of the defence 
ministry’s political-security division, Jerusalem, July 2006.  
121 Senior Israeli official, quoted in Maariv, 20 July 2006. 
122 The offensive initially appeared intended to acquire 
additional bargaining chips in third-party negotiations over 
both a prisoner exchange and a possible ceasefire. 
the targeting of military, parliamentary, government and 
civilian institutions seemed intended to weaken Hamas’s 
hold on power, it failed to deliver fatal blows. Between 28 
June and 18 July, Israel fired over 1,000 artillery shells 
into Gaza123 and carried out back-to-back offensives in the 
south, centre and north. Its air force bombed the prime 
minister’s office, the foreign ministry building (twice) and 
the national economy ministry, and in the West Bank its 
ground forces arrested seven of the 24 ministers in 
the Hamas-led government124 and 27 of its 74 
parliamentarians.125 Much civilian infrastructure in Gaza 
was destroyed, including the bridges connecting its 
northern and southern halves and the power station, 
which cut electricity to most people for most of the day. 
Military targets were bombed despite the high risk of 
civilian, so-called collateral damage. An attack on Hamas 
military leader Mohammed Deif with a 500-pound bomb 
killed seven children and their parents, but not Deif.  
With the opening of a more violent confrontation on 
its northern front, Israel’s prime aim moved from 
military offensive to containment. When it did launch 
incursions, they appeared designed to keep Palestinian 
factions on the defensive and prevent them from tying 
down Israeli troops required further north. As politicians 
and commanders devoted their energies to Lebanon, 
diplomatic efforts were put on the backburner, and the 
question was left hanging whether to negotiate with and 
thus implicitly legitimise the Hamas government.  
This is a gamble. On the admittedly scant evidence so 
far, it is hard to predict that Hizbollah will be defeated 
let alone that this will happen anytime soon. Some in Israel 
support a land campaign, with the goal of occupying a 
thin strip north of the border as a bargaining chip for 
the next round of negotiations over ceasefire arrangements. 
Some suggest going further. But both courses would 
mean a prolonged war and raise the risks that Israel 
would again become deeply entangled in the Lebanese 
mire. Meanwhile, the Palestinian issue festers. 
Dealing differently with Hamas may have political 
resonance. In contrast to what, for now, has been near 
unanimity over the handling of the Lebanese crisis, the 
government’s rejection of a diplomatic settlement with 
Hamas over a ceasefire and prisoner exchange has elicited 
divergent reactions.126 According to an Israeli who was 
 
 
123 Sitrep, UN OCHA, 19 July 2006.  
124 By 20 July, two had been released. Crisis Group interview, 
Sameer Abu Eisheh, the (released) planning minister, Ramallah, 
24 July 2006.  
125 Report of the Palestinian Ministry of Prisoner Affairs, 18 
July 2006. 
126 According to a poll published by the Re’ut Institute on 12 
July 2006, 47 per cent of Israelis opposed and 45 per cent 
favoured ceasefire negotiations with Hamas, at http://www.reut-
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involved in indirect negotiations over the Gaza crisis, the 
terms of a settlement are broadly agreed:  
We’ve known what the endgame – the outcome – is 
since day two of the crisis, following the abduction 
[in Gaza] of the soldier. The aim is to establish a 
moderate Hamas, a weakened Hamas, which can 
accept a two-state solution. It is not to destroy the 
PA. If it will end in a favourable period of quiet, 
including from Qassam rockets, even if the price 
is an implicit recognition of a Hamas or a National 
Unity government, it would be perceived as a good 
deal for Israel. What is at stake is the timing.127 
Israel’s bombing of the Palestinian foreign ministry in 
Gaza and its continued incursions do not, of course, augur 
well for a shift toward engagement.128 Still some Israeli 
officials and foreign diplomats believed they detected “a 
pragmatic shift” in Olmert’s 17 July address to the Knesset 
that ruled out neither a prisoner exchange nor a ceasefire 
with the Hamas-led government.129 Unconfirmed reports 
have surfaced that the frozen Egyptian/Hamas talks on a 
negotiated outcome have resumed. 130  
One more point is worth noting. Among the current 
crises’ more palpable effects has been a dramatic decrease 
in popular support for Olmert’s West Bank unilateral 
withdrawal plans. Hostile penetration from the two areas 
which Israel had previously evacuated significantly 
undermines the popularity of conducting a third. The rocket 
launches further punctured faith in the multi-billion dollar 
land barrier. “No one now believes in one-sided 
convergence”, said Eli Yishai, leader of an Olmert coalition 
partner, Shas.131 In this sense, the large-scale retaliation 
was seen by some as an effort, by re-establishing Israel’s 
overwhelming deterrence, to salvage the unilateral 




prominent figures broke ranks with the official line. “If we have 
an agreement with Hamas over the soldier and halting Qassam 
fire, this would strengthen Hamas, but maybe we should have 
it”. Crisis Group interview, Dan Meridor, chairman of state 
committee on Israel’s National Security for the Coming Decade 
and former minister of strategic affairs with the U.S., Jerusalem, 
July 2006.  
127 Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, July 2006. “We are not 
seeking a new order in Gaza. It’s not for us. I don’t see any 
alternative. I don’t see a united Fatah, and I don’t see anybody 
that can confront Hamas”, Crisis Group interview, foreign 
ministry official, Jerusalem, July 2006.  
128 The foreign ministry is headed by Mahmoud Zahar, brother of 
one of the leaders of Hamas’s military wing in the Gaza Strip.  
129 “Olmert said no word against a prisoner exchange or 
negotiations”, Crisis Group interview, foreign ministry 
official, Jerusalem, July 2006.  
130 Haaretz, 20 July 2006. 
131 Crisis Group interview, Eli Yishai, Jerusalem, July 2006.  
close ministerial allies and a leading supporter of the 
convergence plan, explained: “We are fighting so that 




132 Crisis Group interview, Haim Ramon, Jerusalem, July 2006. 
Speaking in the midst of the Gaza campaign but ahead of the 
escalation in Lebanon, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni had also 
insisted there was “no reason to recant on convergence”, Re’ut 
Conference, Tel Aviv, 12 July 2006.  
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V. CONCLUSION: PRINCIPLES FOR 
RESOLVING THE TWO CRISES 
Efforts at resolving the two crises have been so far 
conspicuously ineffective. On the Palestinian front, Israel, 
while apparently open to a prisoner swap, shies from 
any deal that might enhance Hamas’s prestige and so 
boost its domestic strength, hence its rejection of a 
simultaneous prisoner exchange and insistence on a 
deal for which President Abbas could claim credit. 
Matters have been even less promising on the Lebanese 
front. There, Israel appears convinced it must first seriously 
erode Hizbollah’s military power before contemplating 
a ceasefire or any deal. In this, it enjoys strong support 
from the U.S. which has adamantly opposed pleas for 
an immediate ceasefire, arguing that it would leave in 
place the conditions that led to violence, and backed 
Israel’s determination to “confront the terrorist group that 
launched the attacks and the nations that support it”.133  
Calling a ceasefire at this stage a “false promise”, 
Secretary Rice spoke of the need first to have in place 
“political conditions” – code words both for giving Israel 
more time to conduct its military operations and for 
subsequent steps that would further reduce the threat 
posed to Israel by Hizbollah (e.g., creation of a buffer zone 
from which Hizbollah would be excluded; deployment of 
an international force charged with disarming Hizbollah 
and Lebanese implementation of 1559). Both Islamist 
movements have stood fast, at enormous cost to their 
populations, on the grounds that surrendering the captives 
without compensation – especially after sustaining such 
damage – would deal them fatal political blows. 
Nevertheless, field research and analysis suggest a 
number of key principles that could lead to resolutions.  
A. DELINKING THE CRISES 
The two crises have much in common: both involve 
Islamist movements with one foot in electoral politics, 
the other in violence; territory from which Israel has 
withdrawn; and the capture of Israeli soldiers and the 
demand for a prisoner swap. Both have led to fierce 
Israeli reprisals not only against the movements in 
question, but the civilian population as a whole; and 
both have given rise to temptation to reorder the 
domestic scene, in Palestine as in Lebanon. In the 
language of some Israeli and U.S. officials, moreover, 
both Hamas and Hizbollah were linked in an axis that, 
 
 
133 President George W. Bush, radio address, 22 July 2006. 
together with Syria and Iran, sought to impede progress 
in the region. 
While similarities exist, it would be a mistake to lump 
the two crises together or to view them merely as 
instances of Iran’s attempt to project its power. As 
described above, they are rooted in very different 
domestic circumstances and have very different regional 
implications. To view them through a single lens would 
vastly complicate efforts at resolving either and entail 
potential costs: solidifying perceptions in the Muslim 
world of a conspiracy aimed at all Islamic movements; 
hampering Hamas’s possible political evolution by tying 
its fate to Hizbollah’s; and further radicalising a region 
that is at boiling point. By disaggregating them, dealing 
with both urgently but separately, the international 
community stands a better chance of reaching 
resolutions.  
Nor is there much evidence that the two groups wish to 
be bound together. As the head of the Hamas 
parliamentary faction put it, “We don’t intend to reach a 
joint deal. Hizbollah entered the picture after Hamas was 
already in it, they want their prisoners and we have 
ours”.134 Speaking in Damascus, Hamas’s representative 
in Lebanon, Usama Hamdan, observed: “Hamas’s 
circumstances are different than Hizbollah’s and the 
Palestinian situation is different from that in Lebanon. 
Therefore Hamas’s calculations are different than 
Hizbollah’s”.135 Within the occupied territories, Prime 
Minister Haniya’s 21 July Friday sermon was notable 
for the sparse references to Lebanon, mentioning 
Hizbollah or its leader not once.136 To date, in fact, no 
Palestinian leader has suggested the two crises must be 
resolved as either a package deal or simultaneously.137 
Nor, for that matter, has Hizbollah.138 
 
 
134 Salah al-Bardawil, Haaretz, 22 July 2006. A government 
minister told Crisis Group: “I’m inclined to solve the 
problem [over prisoners] internally, but if we fail we’ll be 
obliged to link them to [those of] Hizbollah. The Palestinian 
street is pushing for the prisoner exchanges to be linked, but 
we as a government have not taken a position.” Crisis Group 
interview, cabinet minister, Ramallah, 24 July 2006. 
135 Crisis Group interview, Damascus, 14 July 2006. 
136 Haniya’s sermon, broadcast live on Al-Jazeera television, 
focused on denunciations of Israel’s determination to bring 
down the elected Palestinian government, and insistence that 
no political concessions would be made in response to Israeli 
pressure.  
137 As noted above, there additionally have been unconfirmed 
reports of renewed mediation in which Hamas is participating.  
138 In his initial press interview after the soldiers’ seizure, 
Hizbollah Secretary General Nasrallah went no further than 
stating that his movement’s actions “may” assist a resolution 
of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. 
Israel/Palestine/Lebanon: Climbing Out of the Abyss 
Crisis Group Middle East Report N°57, 25 July 2006 Page 23 
 
 
B. THE CORE OF AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN 
DEAL: GOVERNANCE FOR CEASEFIRE 
As documented in this report, Hamas’s principal goal 
has been to break the stranglehold imposed on it and 
gain the means of governing. In adopting their stance, 
Israel, but also Europe and the U.S., have underscored 
the need for the Islamists to alter their ideology if they 
expect international assistance. The resulting standoff 
risks plunging the Israeli-Palestinian arena into 
further mayhem. 
Yet developments over the past several weeks suggest 
the outlines of an accommodation. Israel and the PA 
would agree to a mutual ceasefire, perhaps enhanced 
by third party monitoring. In essence, this would mean 
no more Qassam rockets fired by any Palestinian 
faction and an effort by the Palestinian security forces 
to act on any violation, and no more offensive military 
operations, including incursions and targeted 
assassination by Israel. Both would also agree to a 
prisoner exchange. Hamas would release the soldier it 
holds and reinstate the truce, while the PA would seek 
to stop all militias from firing rockets.  
In tandem, Israel would end its Gaza incursion, open 
its border crossings in compliance with the Agreement 
of Access and Monitoring of November 2005, cease 
disproportionate military action in the occupied 
territories and release recently jailed ministers and 
parliamentarians as well as other Palestinian prisoners, 
such as those who have not been charged with an 
offence or have been convicted on minor charges, are 
seriously ill or are juveniles. It is in this respect a 
mistake for the recent G8 resolution to call only for the 
release of elected Hamas officials arrested by Israel 
after the 25 June 2006 seizure of the Israeli soldier. 
Hamas could not accept a prisoner swap only for its 
leaders: it would make it look more interested in its 
own well-being than that of the population at large and 
expose it to criticism that it subjected Gaza to 
destruction in order to release individuals who were not 
jailed at the time of the original Palestinian armed 
operation.  
No such agreement will be sustainable without an 
intra-Palestinian deal, both because Fatah militias have 
been responsible for much of the anti-Israeli violence, 
and because Hamas cannot govern without Fatah’s 
acquiescence. The signing of such a deal on 25 June 
2006 potentially leading to a national unity government 
and recognising Abbas’s primacy in negotiations with 
Israel, has opened the door for an accommodation. It 
should be quickly followed up with formation of such a 
government. 
Finally, for this to hold, the international community 
will have to revise its approach. Again, the 25 June 
intra-Palestinian deal offers an opportunity to start 
almost fresh. Although it does not quite meet Quartet 
conditions, it is a step in the right direction; it should be 
consolidated and encouraged. Should a national 
government be formed on the basis of the National 
Conciliation Document and Hamas agree to a ceasefire, 
the diplomatic and financial boycott should end. 
C. AN URGENT ISRAELI-LEBANESE 
CEASEFIRE  
The most urgent priority on the Lebanese front is for an 
immediate ceasefire. In opposing this, Israel and the 
U.S. argue that, once hostilities cease, the situation 
simply will revert to the status quo ante, with risks of 
future escalation unaddressed. Root causes, they say, 
must be tacked. They have a point. The pre-12 July 
situation was inherently unstable and underlying causes 
should be addressed as soon as possible. But this ought 
not mean that attacks can continue until this happens.  
Prolonged hostilities carry important risks, the most 
obvious of which is continued loss of innocent life and 
needless destruction. There also is the ever-constant 
threat of a catastrophic event, by design or accident: an 
Israeli attack that kills scores of civilians; a Hizbollah 
rocket attack that seriously hurts Tel Aviv, hits a 
chemical plant or some other vital infrastructure; or the 
expansion of the war to Syria. As each day goes by, 
anti-Israel and anti-U.S. sentiment grows, in the region 
and in Lebanon itself. Prime Minister Siniora’s 
government, which Washington purportedly wishes to 
help, is getting weaker, its capacity to restore authority 
and order and implement the desired political changes 
once the violence dies down feebler by the day. The 
U.S. repeatedly has stated its intention of bolstering 
him but has not acceded to his most pressing request: 
an immediate cessation of hostilities. The conflict may 
also spread in other ways: in Iraq, fellow Shiites may 
get increasingly restless and turn their ire on the U.S., 
as previewed in statements by Muqtada al-Sadr and 
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.  
Nor is there strong evidence that a little more time will 
lead to significantly more degradation of Hizbollah’s 
military capacity. Success from airpower alone is 
questionable at best. A ground offensive may be next, 
but at what cost to Lebanon and its fragile political 
system? Moving to ground warfare also would put the 
fight on Hizbollah’s terrain, with risks of another 
quagmire of the sort Israel has encountered on other 
occasions in Lebanon. In the event of an extended war 
of attrition and bereft of an honourable exit strategy, the 
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government could face rising criticism, domestically and 
internationally. As a former Israeli official put it, 
“organisations such as Hizbollah cannot be defeated on 
points. Only a knock-out will do. But such a defeat is, at 
this point, simply impossible”.139 In other words, time 
may not help achieve the objective.  
The challenge, therefore, is to devise a ceasefire deal 
that is both acceptable to all sides and can be achieved 
quickly. Israel is unlikely to agree to a ceasefire that 
does not include some step that significantly reduces the 
threat presented by Hizbollah; Hizbollah is unlikely to 
agree to measures that signify its disarmament and, 
therefore, the end of its special status. Mindful of those 
constraints, Crisis Group proposes a ceasefire that would 
include the following three elements: 
 an immediate cessation of hostilities; rapidly 
followed by 
 early prisoner exchange; and 
 agreement on the dispatch of a multinational force 
to augment UNIFIL and verify compliance with 
the ceasefire.  
Both the sequence and substance of this proposed 
arrangement will be controversial. As to the sequence: 
Israel, with U.S. backing, has argued forcefully that no 
cessation of hostilities should occur until steps are 
agreed that will significantly erode Hizbollah’s military 
capacity. But, as seen, there are serious costs to waiting, 
and little certainty that time will bring Israel any closer 
to its objective of crippling Hizbollah by military means. 
For this reason, Crisis Group believes an immediate halt 
to the fighting is an urgent necessity. Of course, should 
the two other conditions not be met to Israel’s 
satisfaction, there is every reason to think that it would 
resume hostilities.  
As to the substance: the dispatch of a multinational force 
raises enormously complex and difficult issues. Given 
Lebanon’s history, the depth of sectarian tensions, and 
Syria’s persistent influence, injection of foreign troops 
viewed as hostile to Hizbollah, or over the movement’s 
objection, could push the country to breaking point. 
Already, as seen, Shiite popular resentment over how 
the rest of the country is reacting to Israel’s onslaught is 
growing; in the horrendous humanitarian conditions 
experienced by displaced Shiites, it would not take 
much to cause an internal explosion. That could be the 
case if a force were mandated to enforce the 
movement’s disarmament or take other action against it. 
Under either scenario, Hizbollah and its sympathisers 
(and perhaps also militant Sunni Islamist groups) could 
 
 
139 Crisis Group interview, former Israeli official, 24 July 2006. 
portray the troops as foreign occupiers and treat them 
accordingly. Hizbollah would be unlikely to surrender 
quietly and might well drag the country down with it 
should it feel its survival at stake. Ultimately, anything 
that prioritises Hizbollah’s swift and forced disarmament 
at this point could push the fragile nation to breaking 
point, rekindling a confessional civil war that the 
international community – having helped begin – would 
helplessly watch. 
That said, Israel will insist on some mechanism to 
ensure hostilities will not resume. The notion that the 
Lebanese army could play a policing role vis-à-vis 
Hizbollah is illusory; the army reflects the country’s 
confessional makeup and is not in a position to take on 
the Islamist movement. A multinational force, therefore, 
has become a regrettable necessity. But its role and 
mandate will have to be strictly defined to avoid 
precipitating chaos: 
 It should be agreed to by all sides, Hizbollah 
included.140 While for now the movement is 
adamant it will not accept an international force, 
officials have left the door open by suggesting 
they would be open to ideas that emerge from 
internal dialogue.141 
 It must be authorised by the UN Security Council 
(the lessons from Iraq are, in this respect, clear) 
and should as much as possible avoid a U.S. 
flavour. While NATO forces could possibly 
participate, they should at a minimum be part of a 
larger contingent to avoid the impression of a 
Western crusade. 
 It should have a limited mandate: not, as Israel 
would prefer, to enforce Hizbollah’s disarmament, 
but rather to verify and monitor both sides’ 
adherence to the ceasefire while ensuring creation 
in the south of a weapons-free zone. 
 It should from the outset interact with the 
Lebanese army. 
There is of course a strong argument that this might not 
suffice to prevent a resumption of hostilities since it 
would leave Hizbollah’s power largely intact. But 
anything more at this point would risk unduly 
prolonging negotiation and, worse, risk destabilising 
Lebanon’s fragile inter-confessional balance. 
 
 
140 As an Arab diplomat with years of experience in Lebanon 
put it, “a force will be possible only if all Lebanese parties 
agree. The government’s agreement is not enough. You need 
Hizbollah’s agreement – and, implicitly, Syria’s”. Crisis 
Group interview, 24 July 2006. 
141 Crisis Group interview, al-Hajj Hassan, 25 July 2006. 
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D. GETTING TO ALL THE ROOT CAUSES  
There is little doubt that the conditions that led to the 
current crisis should not be allowed to endure. As 
Secretary Rice enunciated, “root causes” must be tackled. 
In defining them, however, she mentioned only 
Hizbollah’s military arsenal – a cause, no doubt, and a 
significant one since it threatens Lebanese sovereignty 
and Israeli security. But it is not the only one, nor 
indeed is it one that can be tackled on its own. If a 
serious diplomatic effort is to be launched – preferably 
after an immediate ceasefire is achieved, but with no 
respite once it is – it will need to be far broader than the 
current selective U.S. menu suggests – and far more 
energetically pursued than recent history portends. 
Hizbollah’s armed status is part of a far larger puzzle 
that at the very least needs to be taken into account. It 
is related to Lebanon’s confessional structure and, 
principally, to the treatment of its Shiite community 
and long overdue political reform. To undermine 
Hizbollah’s standing without at the same time 
addressing Shiite grievances would, again, run the risk 
of renewed sectarian conflict. In this sense, Resolution 
1559, in its insistence on disarmament and international 
backing in that regard, implicitly threatened the country’s 
delicate sectarian balance since it meant a significant 
weakening of the Shiites’ principal representative. The 
goal, in other words, should not be solely to weaken 
Hizbollah (or Syria, or Iran), but through an internal 
Lebanese dialogue, to seriously reform the political 
system as a whole. In parallel, there should be international 
commitment to a massive reconstruction effort in Lebanon 
and, above all, to significantly alleviate the country’s public 
debt. 
Hizbollah’s fate also is related to Lebanon’s own 
security doctrine and how its army intends to credibly 
ensure its defence, as well as to still-open Israeli-
Lebanese files: prisoners and the Shebaa farms, as well 
as the question of respect for Lebanon’s sovereignty. 
Tackling these problems would be an important way to 
promote Hizbollah’s political transformation, by removing 
justifications it invokes for continued resistance and 
increasing internal political pressure for its disarmament. 
The goal must be to dry up the sources of Hizbollah’s 
militant identity gradually. One of the most important 
issues in this respect is Shebaa: an initiative should be 
launched whereby Syria would formally recognise 
Lebanese sovereignty there, while Israel would withdraw. 
Finally, and perhaps most difficult, it is closely linked 
with regional issues, including Syria and Iran’s role and 
activation (or not) of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace 
process. Certainly, taking care of Lebanon’s problems need 
not await resolution of the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. 
But serious steps to resume Arab-Israeli negotiations on 
both the Palestinian and Syrian tracks, coupled with a 
decision by the West to engage Syria and Iran on all 
issues of regional concerns, including their regional 
concerns, would allow efforts at de-militarising Hizbollah 
and stabilising Lebanon to take place in a far safer, less 
explosive environment.  
For the past several years, such issues have been left 
dormant. Today, the region – and most of all the Lebanese, 
Palestinian and Israeli peoples – are paying the price. It 
is time something is done about it or the price will grow 
steeper, also, inevitably, for the U.S. and Europe. 
Amman/Beirut/Brussels/Jerusalem, 25 July 2006 
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